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  1. On the politics of the regulatory reform
    econometric evidence from the OECD countries
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

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  2. On the politics of the regulatory reform: econometric evidence from the OECD countries
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2002

    Abstract: "This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional... mehr

     

    Abstract: "This paper empirically investigates contrasting views on the politics of economic policy. Merging different databases, we test various predictions coming form different strands of literature, with the aim of explaining the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the degree of regulatory intervention and entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications industry of OECD countries during the 1990's. We analyze the role of political institutions, government's types and ideological position, industry and consumers' private interests, as well as the regulatory environment in shaping regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that all these sets of variables help to explain some degree of variability in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, political and regulatory institutions and the pressure of strong incumbent firms are found to be the most important factors." (author's abstract)

     
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  3. Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: evidence from the US cellular industry
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2001

    Abstract: "This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly... mehr

     

    Abstract: "This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly model this two way causality, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find support for our approach: Regulatory choice should be considered endogenous. Accounting for the simultaneity bias, we show that regulation, whenever it actually took place, did not reduce significantly cellular tariffs. However, it would have been more effective if applied in those markets which have not been regulated. To explain this finding, we show that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been successful, so that firms were able to avoid regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective. From the political economy side, we provide evidence that the probability of price regulation was higher, cet

     
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  4. Who decides to regulate? Lobbying activity in the U.S. cellular industry
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2000

    Abstract: "How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role... mehr

     

    Abstract: "How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role of regulation, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find support for our approach: regulatory choice should be considered endogenous. We show that, correcting for the simultaneity, regulation's overall effect should have been a reduction of cellular tariffs. However, this result is not highly significant. Our explanation for this finding is that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been successful: some firms were able to avoid regulation in those market where it would have significantly reduced prices. We argue that this is the real source of the found simultaneity. Moreover, we provide evidence that the probability of regulation was higher, other things equal, when the regulator was appoi

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11586
    DDC Klassifikation: Wirtschaft (330); Handel, Kommunikation, Verkehr (380); Management und unterstützende Tätigkeiten (650); Industrielle Fertigung (670); Wirtschaft (330)
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-05
    Schlagworte: Mobile Telekommunikation; Telekommunikationspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Marktverhalten; Schätzung; :z Geschichte 1984-1988
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)1984-1988; (stw)Mobilkommunikation; (stw)Telekommunikationspolitik; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Wirkungsanalyse; (stw)Struktur-Verhalten-Ergebnis- Paradigma; (stw)Schätzung; (stw)USA; (thesoz)Behörde; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)Telekommunikation; (thesoz)Preisbildung; (thesoz)USA; (thesoz)Marktordnung; (thesoz)Lobby; (thesoz)Nordamerika; (thesoz)Industrie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 39 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  5. Lobbying and regulation in a political economy
    evidence from the US cellular industry
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Berlin

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  6. Who decides to regulate? - lobbying activity in the US cellular industry
    Autor*in: Duso, Tomaso
    Erschienen: 2000
    Verlag:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Berlin

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