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Displaying results 76 to 100 of 153.

  1. Flow Trading
    Author: Budish, Eric B.; Cramton, Peter C.; Kyle, Albert S.; Lee, Jeongmin; Malec, David
    Published: April 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities as flows (shares/second). Batch auctions clear all asset markets jointly in discrete time. Market-clearing prices and quantities are shown to exist, despite the wide variety of preferences that can be expressed. Calculating prices and quantities is shown to be computationally feasible. Microfoundations are provided to show that traders can implement optimal strategies using portfolio orders. We discuss several potential advantages of the new market design, arising from the combination of discrete time and continuous prices and quantities (the most widely used alternative has these reversed) and the novel approach to trading portfolios of assets

     
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  2. Perth-Amboy, January 21st 1739-40
    Whereas in a cause depending in the Court of Chancery of New-Jersey at the suit of the creditors and legatees of Charles Dunstar deceased, against Michael Kearney, and James Alexander
    Author: Kearny, Michael
    Published: 1740
    Publisher:  Printed by John Peter Zenger, where advertisements are taken in, New-York

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Subjects: Real property; Auctions; Vente aux enchères - New Jersey - Perth Amboy; Auctions; Decedents' estates; Real property; Advertisements - Auctions; Advertisements - Real property; Broadsides
    Other subjects: Dunstar, Charles (-1739?)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (1 sheet)
    Notes:

    Signed: Michael Kearney, James Alexander

    Bristol, B1098

    Shipton & Mooney, 40208
  3. New-York, April 10. 1731. Advertisement
    on the second Wednesday of May next, there is to be sold at publick vendue to the highest bidder, the plantation now in the tenure and occupation of Myndert Lefever
    Author: Lefever, Myndert
    Published: 1731
    Publisher:  [publisher not identified], [New York]

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Subjects: Real property; Auctions; Biens réels - New York (État) - New York; Vente aux enchères - New York (État) - New York; Auctions; Real property; History; Sources; Sources; Broadsides; Advertisements - Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (1 sheet)
    Notes:

    Bristol, B849

    Shipton & Mooney, 39971
  4. New-York, October 10. 1730, advertisement
    on the second day of November next, there is to be sold at publick vendue, to the highest bidder, the plantation now in the tenor and occupation of Myndert Lefever
    Author: Lefever, Myndert
    Published: 1730
    Publisher:  [publisher not identified], [New York]

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Subjects: Real property; Auctions; Biens réels - New York (État) - New York; Vente aux enchères - New York (État) - New York; Auctions; Real property; History; Sources; Sources; Broadsides; Advertisements - Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (1 sheet)
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    Bristol, B824

    Shipton & Mooney, 39951
  5. Charlestown, February 3d, 1768. The sale of Negroes belonging to Mr. John Miles
    advertised in the gazettes for this day, is put off to Friday next when the said Negroes ... will be sold by publick outcry at Mr. Nightingall's on Charlestown-Neck ... Robert Wells, vendue-master
    Author: Wells, Robert
    Published: 1768
    Publisher:  [Printed by Robert Wells], [Charleston, S.C.]

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Subjects: Slave trade; African Americans; Auctions; Esclaves - Commerce - Caroline du Sud; Noirs américains - Caroline du Sud; Vente aux enchères - Caroline du Sud - Charleston; African Americans; Auctions; Slave trade; History; Broadsides
    Other subjects: Miles, John (Slaveholder)
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (1 broadside), illustrations (relief cuts)
    Notes:

    Followed by a notice signed by Thomas Nightingall establishing regulations for public sales at his house

    Relief cuts at head (Reilly 1059, 1060, 1061, and 1062); printed area measures 18.4 x 12.5 cm

    Bristol, B2964

    Shipton & Mooney, 41896

    Gould & Morgan. South Carolina, 261
  6. Auctions with frictions
    recruitment, entry, and limited commitment
    Author: Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
    Published: March 2024
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, [Bonn]

    Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and... more

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    Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellersícommitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive several novel predictions; in particular, we Önd that outcomes are often ineffi cient, and the market sometimes unravels.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289574
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 288
    Subjects: Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Information-Based Pricing in Specialized Lending
    Author: Blickle, Kristian; He, Zhiguo; Huang, Jing; Parlatore, Cecilia
    Published: February 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an... more

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    We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further interactions with the borrower, allowing it to access "specialized" signals. In equilibrium, both lenders use general signals to screen loan applications, and the specialized lender prices the loan based on its specialized signal conditional on making a loan. This private-information-based pricing helps deliver the empirical regularity that loans made by specialized lenders have lower rates (i.e., lower winning bids) and better ex-post performance (i.e., lower non-performing loans). We show the robustness of our equilibrium characterization under a generalized information structure, endogenize the specialized lending through information acquisition, and discuss its various economic implications

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w32155
    Subjects: Bank; Kreditgeschäft; Preismanagement; Asymmetrische Information; Kreditwürdigkeit; Theorie; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors; General
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  8. Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
    Author: Reuter, Marco
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about... more

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    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and show that it can be implemented by introducing a communication stage before an auction. I show that granting bidders a right to remain anonymous, i.e., to refuse participation in the communication stage, leaves the optimal mechanism unchanged and provides no benefits for the bidders.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/280987
    Edition: Last update: November 8, 2023
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 23, 051 (11/2023)
    Subjects: Mechanism Design; Auctions; Partially Verifiable Types; Communication
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  9. Money Isn't Everything
    Estimating the Prestige Value of Winning Cutthroat Kitchen from Overbidding in Sabotage Auctions
    Author: Snyder, Meg; Bragen, Daniel; Rousu, Matthew C.; Snyder, Christopher M.
    Published: January 2024
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We seek to estimate the prestige value of winning beyond monetary prizes in Cutthroat Kitchen, a cooking show in which dishes are judged in a series of elimination rounds, with the twist that action is periodically paused to auction sabotages against... more

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    We seek to estimate the prestige value of winning beyond monetary prizes in Cutthroat Kitchen, a cooking show in which dishes are judged in a series of elimination rounds, with the twist that action is periodically paused to auction sabotages against rivals. We estimate the distribution of contestants' prestige values using a structural model of bidding by a contestant with rational expectations about sabotage effectiveness taken from the data. Our most conservative specification--allowing for risk aversion and bias in the beliefs about sabotage effectiveness--yields mean prestige values of nearly $10,000 for typical episodes and over $35,000 for tournaments

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w32070
    Subjects: Fernsehprogramm; Auktionstheorie; Auctions; Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making; Economics of the Arts and Literature
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  10. Investing in superheroes?
    comic art as a new alternative investment
    Author: Bocart, Fabian; Hafner, Christian M.; Kasperskaya, Yulia; Sagarra, Marti
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/220659
    Series: CORE discussion papers ; 2019, 16
    Subjects: Comic Art; Alternative Investments; Auctions; Hedonic regressions; Price index; Portfolio
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Second-chance offers and buyer reputation
    theory and evidence on auctions with default
    Author: Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; Valente, Marieta
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second-chance" offers, where the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price, and they let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default.... more

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    Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second-chance" offers, where the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price, and they let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders with a reputation for defaulting, counter to the idea of deterring such behavior. Our auction experiments support these predictions and provide insights on their practical relevance.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222134
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 237 (April 21, 2020)
    Subjects: Auctions; Default; Reputation; Second-Chance Offers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Allocating essential inputs
    Author: Rey, Patrick; Salant, David J.
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 820 (17)
    Subjects: Auctions; Market design; Essential inputs; Regulation; Antitrust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. How do digital advertising auctions impact product prices?
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nicholas
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2367 (July 2023)
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; Automated Bidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Managed campaigns and data-augmented auctions for digital advertising
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nicholas
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2359 (April 2023)
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions
    Author: Li, Xinyu; Haan, Marco; Onderstal, Sander; Veldman, Jasper
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Globally, governments increasingly rely on auctions to advance renewable energy. This paper studies the design of wind farm auctions and evaluates the impact of price guarantees and subsidies on auction efficiency, government revenue, and... more

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    Globally, governments increasingly rely on auctions to advance renewable energy. This paper studies the design of wind farm auctions and evaluates the impact of price guarantees and subsidies on auction efficiency, government revenue, and renewable-energy production. While the theoretical analysis suggests that the price guarantee has no effect, our laboratory experiment suggests that the price guarantee improves efficiency and that it often increases production and revenue. An important explanation for these results is that less risk averse subjects tend to bid less aggressively and produce less. Without the price guarantee, and hence with more uncertainty in the auction, this increases the chances that risk-loving bidders win the auction, thus compromising auction efficiency. The subsidy is less effective than suggested by theory. Bidders with a higher valuation tend to bid more conservatively than the equilibrium prediction, thus neutralizing the efficiency-enhancing effect of the subsidy

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282859
    Series: Array ; TI 2023, 046
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiments; Wind farms; Renewable energy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Managed campaigns and data-augmented auctions for digital advertising
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nianqiang
    Published: 17 April 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Array ; DP18087
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. The Stench of Failure
    How Perception Affects House Prices
    Author: Cortés, Kristle Romero; Singh, Mandeep; Solomon, David H.; Strahan, Philip E.
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    In Australian real estate markets, about a third of properties are sold at auction. We show that properties that fail auctions sell later for a 2.6% discount. This effect increases for properties failing multiple auctions and when no bids are made.... more

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    In Australian real estate markets, about a third of properties are sold at auction. We show that properties that fail auctions sell later for a 2.6% discount. This effect increases for properties failing multiple auctions and when no bids are made. Consistent with a causal channel, the effect holds when auction failure is instrumented by the tendency of owners to anchor on nearby better properties (and thus set reserve prices too high). Prices cluster just below salient round numbers, and the discount fades over time, inconsistent with our effects reflecting unobserved property characteristics. We test for several mechanisms and conclude that most of the pricing discounts reflect stigma, which reduces potential buyers’ willingness to pay

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: UNSW Business School Research Paper
    Subjects: Auctions; Property Markets; Auction Failure; Stigma
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
    Notes:

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 7, 2022 erstellt
  18. How do digital advertising auctions impact product prices?
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nianqiang
    Published: 04 August 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Array ; DP18346
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Procurement and Infrastructure Costs
    Author: Liscow, Zachary; Nober, Will; Slattery, Cailin
    Published: September 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Infrastructure costs in the United States are high and rising. The procurement process is one potential cost driver. In this paper we conduct a survey of procurement practices across the 50 states. We survey both employees at each state department of... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Infrastructure costs in the United States are high and rising. The procurement process is one potential cost driver. In this paper we conduct a survey of procurement practices across the 50 states. We survey both employees at each state department of transportation (DOT) and the road builders that win contracts to build and maintain roads. With this survey we are able to create a new dataset of procurement rules and practices across the U.S. and understand what actors on the ground think drive costs. We then assemble a new dataset of project-level infrastructure costs. We correlate the survey practices with our new, detailed data on costs. We find that two important inputs in the procurement process appear to particularly drive costs: (1) the capacity of the DOT procuring the project and (2) the lack of competition in the market for government construction contracts

     
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  20. Do "white knights" make excessive profits in bank resolution?
    Author: Heider, Florian; Schlegel, Jonas; Tröger, Tobias; Wahrenburg, Mark
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, [Frankfurt am Main]

    This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By... more

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    This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By estimating marked-based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we find positive abnormal returns in all four cases which when made quantifiable, are around half of the FT's accounting figures. Furthermore, we argue that transparent auctions with enough bidders should be preferred to negotiated bank sales. This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/280399
    Series: White paper ; no. 98 (November 2023)
    Subjects: Bank Resolution; Bank Acquisition; Auctions; "Event Study"
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Search platforms
    big data and sponsored positions
    Author: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Jungbauer, Thomas; Preuß, Marcel; Williams, Cole
    Published: 24 November 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18639
    Subjects: Search; Digital platforms; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten)
  22. Solutions in multi-actor projects with collaboration and strategic incentives
    Author: Beek, Andries van
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056687199
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    Series: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 717 (2023)]
    Subjects: Incentives; Mathematical Analysis; Two-Stage Model; Game Theory; Cost Allocation; Non-Cooperative Game; Social Welfare; Solution Concepts; Transport Infrastructure; Welfare Loss; Co2; Nash Equilibrium; Auctions; Decision-Making Process
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 213 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2023
  23. Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints
    Author: Arve, Malin; Martimort, David
    Published: September 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1469
    Subjects: Auctions; procurement; financial constraints; dynamic mechanism design; asymmetric information; uncertainty; endogenous risk aversion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)
  24. A market for airport slots
    Author: Marra, M. R.
    Published: 05 September 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP19442
    Subjects: Airline industry; Structural estimation; Airports; Auctions; Demand estimation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
    Author: Roberts, James W.
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ERID working paper ; 80
    Subjects: Auctions; Unobserved Heterogeneity
    Scope: Online-Ressource (54 S.), graph. Darst.