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  1. Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
    Author: Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the... more

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    Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the scoring rule of the contest, which varies the relative competitiveness of the players. We show that the optimum depends on the designer's objective. A bilateral symmetric contest--in which information is symmetrically distributed and the scoring bias is set to offset the initial asymmetry between players--always maximizes the expected total effort. However, the optimal contest may deliberately create bilateral asymmetry--which discloses the signal privately to one player, while favoring the other in terms of the scoring rule--when the designer is concerned about the expected winner's effort. The two instruments thus exhibit complementarity, in that the optimum can be made asymmetric in both dimensions even if the players are ex ante symmetric. Our results are qualitatively robust to (i) affiliated signals and (ii) endogenous information structure. We show that information favoritism can play a useful role in addressing affirmative action objectives

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w31036
    Subjects: Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Asymmetrische Information; Systematischer Fehler; Auktionstheorie; Spieltheorie; Noncooperative Games; Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Artificial intelligence & data obfuscation
    algorithmic competition in digital ad auctions
    Author: Decarolis, Francesco; Rovigatti, Gabriele; Rovigatti, Michele; Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
    Published: 20 March 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18009
    Subjects: Asymmetric Information; Auctions; Procurement; Ar-tificial Intelligence; Collusion; Data; Privacy; Data Governance,Digital Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Flow Trading
    Author: Budish, Eric B.; Cramton, Peter C.; Kyle, Albert S.; Lee, Jeongmin; Malec, David
    Published: April 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand... more

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    We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities as flows (shares/second). Batch auctions clear all asset markets jointly in discrete time. Market-clearing prices and quantities are shown to exist, despite the wide variety of preferences that can be expressed. Calculating prices and quantities is shown to be computationally feasible. Microfoundations are provided to show that traders can implement optimal strategies using portfolio orders. We discuss several potential advantages of the new market design, arising from the combination of discrete time and continuous prices and quantities (the most widely used alternative has these reversed) and the novel approach to trading portfolios of assets

     
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  4. Revenue maximization with partially verifiable information
    Author: Reuter, Marco
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about... more

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    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and show that it can be implemented by introducing a communication stage before an auction. I show that granting bidders a right to remain anonymous, i.e., to refuse participation in the communication stage, leaves the optimal mechanism unchanged and provides no benefits for the bidders.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/280987
    Edition: Last update: November 8, 2023
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 23, 051 (11/2023)
    Subjects: Mechanism Design; Auctions; Partially Verifiable Types; Communication
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  5. How do digital advertising auctions impact product prices?
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nicholas
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2367 (July 2023)
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; Automated Bidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Managed campaigns and data-augmented auctions for digital advertising
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nicholas
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2359 (April 2023)
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions
    Author: Li, Xinyu; Haan, Marco; Onderstal, Sander; Veldman, Jasper
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Globally, governments increasingly rely on auctions to advance renewable energy. This paper studies the design of wind farm auctions and evaluates the impact of price guarantees and subsidies on auction efficiency, government revenue, and... more

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    Globally, governments increasingly rely on auctions to advance renewable energy. This paper studies the design of wind farm auctions and evaluates the impact of price guarantees and subsidies on auction efficiency, government revenue, and renewable-energy production. While the theoretical analysis suggests that the price guarantee has no effect, our laboratory experiment suggests that the price guarantee improves efficiency and that it often increases production and revenue. An important explanation for these results is that less risk averse subjects tend to bid less aggressively and produce less. Without the price guarantee, and hence with more uncertainty in the auction, this increases the chances that risk-loving bidders win the auction, thus compromising auction efficiency. The subsidy is less effective than suggested by theory. Bidders with a higher valuation tend to bid more conservatively than the equilibrium prediction, thus neutralizing the efficiency-enhancing effect of the subsidy

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    hdl: 10419/282859
    Series: Array ; TI 2023, 046
    Subjects: Auctions; Experiments; Wind farms; Renewable energy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Managed campaigns and data-augmented auctions for digital advertising
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nianqiang
    Published: 17 April 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18087
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. The Stench of Failure
    How Perception Affects House Prices
    Author: Cortés, Kristle Romero; Singh, Mandeep; Solomon, David H.; Strahan, Philip E.
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    In Australian real estate markets, about a third of properties are sold at auction. We show that properties that fail auctions sell later for a 2.6% discount. This effect increases for properties failing multiple auctions and when no bids are made.... more

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    In Australian real estate markets, about a third of properties are sold at auction. We show that properties that fail auctions sell later for a 2.6% discount. This effect increases for properties failing multiple auctions and when no bids are made. Consistent with a causal channel, the effect holds when auction failure is instrumented by the tendency of owners to anchor on nearby better properties (and thus set reserve prices too high). Prices cluster just below salient round numbers, and the discount fades over time, inconsistent with our effects reflecting unobserved property characteristics. We test for several mechanisms and conclude that most of the pricing discounts reflect stigma, which reduces potential buyers’ willingness to pay

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: UNSW Business School Research Paper
    Subjects: Auctions; Property Markets; Auction Failure; Stigma
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
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    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 7, 2022 erstellt
  10. How do digital advertising auctions impact product prices?
    Author: Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro; Wu, Nianqiang
    Published: 04 August 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18346
    Subjects: Data; Advertising; Competition; Digital Platforms; Auctions; AutomatedBidding; Managed Advertising Campaigns; Matching; Price Discrimination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Procurement and Infrastructure Costs
    Author: Liscow, Zachary; Nober, Will; Slattery, Cailin
    Published: September 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Infrastructure costs in the United States are high and rising. The procurement process is one potential cost driver. In this paper we conduct a survey of procurement practices across the 50 states. We survey both employees at each state department of... more

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    Infrastructure costs in the United States are high and rising. The procurement process is one potential cost driver. In this paper we conduct a survey of procurement practices across the 50 states. We survey both employees at each state department of transportation (DOT) and the road builders that win contracts to build and maintain roads. With this survey we are able to create a new dataset of procurement rules and practices across the U.S. and understand what actors on the ground think drive costs. We then assemble a new dataset of project-level infrastructure costs. We correlate the survey practices with our new, detailed data on costs. We find that two important inputs in the procurement process appear to particularly drive costs: (1) the capacity of the DOT procuring the project and (2) the lack of competition in the market for government construction contracts

     
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  12. Do "white knights" make excessive profits in bank resolution?
    Author: Heider, Florian; Schlegel, Jonas; Tröger, Tobias; Wahrenburg, Mark
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, [Frankfurt am Main]

    This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By... more

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    This study looks at potential windfall profits for the four banking acquisitions in 2023. Based on accounting figures, an FT article states that a total of USD 44bn was left on the table. We see accounting figures as a misleading analysis. By estimating marked-based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we find positive abnormal returns in all four cases which when made quantifiable, are around half of the FT's accounting figures. Furthermore, we argue that transparent auctions with enough bidders should be preferred to negotiated bank sales. This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/280399
    Series: White paper ; no. 98 (November 2023)
    Subjects: Bank Resolution; Bank Acquisition; Auctions; "Event Study"
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Search platforms
    big data and sponsored positions
    Author: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Jungbauer, Thomas; Preuß, Marcel; Williams, Cole
    Published: 24 November 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18639
    Subjects: Search; Digital platforms; Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten)
  14. Solutions in multi-actor projects with collaboration and strategic incentives
    Author: Beek, Andries van
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056687199
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    Series: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 717 (2023)]
    Subjects: Incentives; Mathematical Analysis; Two-Stage Model; Game Theory; Cost Allocation; Non-Cooperative Game; Social Welfare; Solution Concepts; Transport Infrastructure; Welfare Loss; Co2; Nash Equilibrium; Auctions; Decision-Making Process
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 213 Seiten), Illustrationen
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  15. Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints
    Author: Arve, Malin; Martimort, David
    Published: September 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1469
    Subjects: Auctions; procurement; financial constraints; dynamic mechanism design; asymmetric information; uncertainty; endogenous risk aversion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)