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  1. A continuous dilemma
    Autor*in: Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics, Santa Cruz, Calif.

    We study prisoner's dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 238 (657)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study prisoner's dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods, they approach the level seen in continuous sessions. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how the capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. -- Prisoner's dilemma ; game theory ; laboratory experiment ; continuous time game

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/64489
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / UC Santa Cruz Economics Department ; 657
    Schlagworte: Gefangenendilemma; Dynamisches Spiel; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Separating the hawks from the doves
    Autor*in: Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics, Santa Cruz, Calif.

    Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 238 (658)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory. -- Evolutionary dynamics ; Hawk-Dove game ; game theory ; laboratory experiment ; continuous time game

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/64506
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / UC Santa Cruz Economics Department ; 658
    Schlagworte: Dynamisches Spiel; Konflikt; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (15 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Testing the TASP
    an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria
    Autor*in: Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Univ. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics, Santa Cruz, Calif.

    We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 238 (660)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments. -- Games ; experiments ; TASP ; learning ; unstable ; mixed equilibrium ; fictitious play

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/64507
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / UC Santa Cruz Economics Department ; 660
    Schlagworte: Spieltheorie; Lernprozess; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (37 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Speculative attacks
    a laboratory study in continuous time
    Autor*in: Cheung, Yin-Wong; Friedman, Daniel
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Hong Kong Inst. for Monetary Research, Hong Kong

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: HKIMR working paper ; 2009,07
    Schlagworte: Währungskrise; Währungsspekulation; Experiment; Spieltheorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (30 S.), graph. Darst.