Tannaitic literature widely discusses whether one may bequeath property in a will, overriding the biblical provisions regarding inheritance. Many subsequent scholars researched the reasons for, and the timing of, the infiltration of the will into the...
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Tannaitic literature widely discusses whether one may bequeath property in a will, overriding the biblical provisions regarding inheritance. Many subsequent scholars researched the reasons for, and the timing of, the infiltration of the will into the realm of halakha. The considerable scholarly interest in this issue is probably due to the fact that the laws of inheritance reveal society's values regarding important issues such as the meaning of private property, individual autonomy, family structure, women's status, etc. Change in the laws of inheritance may indicate transformations in these values. Moreover, the debate over the will reveals the manner in which halakha adapts itself to change. Surprisingly, however, the rule in Gittin 14b, mitzva le-kayem divrei ha-met ("it is a mitzva to fulfill the wishes [lit: to uphold the words] of the deceased") was largely ignored in the scholarly discourse regarding the laws of inheritance. This rule is a significant element in the Tannaitic debate and is implicitly evoked more than is initially apparent. The rule's intent is more radical than previously assumed — rather than being a moral duty, dividing the possessions of the deceased in accordance with his wishes is a normative obligation. In the Amoraic deliberation of this rule there is a consistent trend to restrict it's power. A new understanding of the concept of property rights was the major factor in the attempt to legitimize testamentary succession. The biblical notion of rights was familial; in the rabbinic period, however, the idea of individual property reigned, and thus it became necessary to allow one to will his property.
