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  1. Harms of AI
    Autor*in: Acemoglu, Daron
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This essay discusses several potential economic, political and social costs of the current path of AI technologies. I argue that if AI continues to be deployed along its current trajectory and remains unregulated, it may produce various social,... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    keine Fernleihe
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    keine Fernleihe
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This essay discusses several potential economic, political and social costs of the current path of AI technologies. I argue that if AI continues to be deployed along its current trajectory and remains unregulated, it may produce various social, economic and political harms. These include: damaging competition, consumer privacy and consumer choice; excessively automating work, fueling inequality, inefficiently pushing down wages, and failing to improve worker productivity; and damaging political discourse, democracy's most fundamental lifeblood. Although there is no conclusive evidence suggesting that these costs are imminent or substantial, it may be useful to understand them before they are fully realized and become harder or even impossible to reverse, precisely because of AI's promising and wide-reaching potential. I also suggest that these costs are not inherent to the nature of AI technologies, but are related to how they are being used and developed at the moment - to empower corporations and governments against workers and citizens. As a result, efforts to limit and reverse these costs may need to rely on regulation and policies to redirect AI research. Attempts to contain them just by promoting competition may be insufficient

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29247
    Schlagworte: Künstliche Intelligenz; Soziale Kosten; Datenschutz; Arbeitsbedingungen; Lohnniveau; Einkommensverteilung
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

  2. How Good Are Privacy Guarantees? Platform Architecture and Violation of User Privacy
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Many platforms deploy data collected from users for a multitude of purposes. While some are beneficial to users, others are costly to their privacy. The presence of these privacy costs means that platforms may need to provide guarantees about how and... mehr

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Resolving-System (lizenzpflichtig)
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    keine Fernleihe
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    keine Fernleihe
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    keine Fernleihe
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    keine Fernleihe
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Many platforms deploy data collected from users for a multitude of purposes. While some are beneficial to users, others are costly to their privacy. The presence of these privacy costs means that platforms may need to provide guarantees about how and to what extent user data will be harvested for activities such as targeted ads, individualized pricing, and sales to third parties. In this paper, we build a multi-stage model in which users decide whether to share their data based on privacy guarantees. We first introduce a novel mask-shuffle mechanism and prove it is Pareto optimal--meaning that it leaks the least about the users' data for any given leakage about the underlying common parameter. We then show that under any mask-shuffle mechanism, there exists a unique equilibrium in which privacy guarantees balance privacy costs and utility gains from the pooling of user data for purposes such as assessment of health risks or product development. Paradoxically, we show that as users' value of pooled data increases, the equilibrium of the game leads to lower user welfare. This is because platforms take advantage of this change to reduce privacy guarantees so much that user utility declines (whereas it would have increased with a given mechanism). Even more strikingly, we show that platforms have incentives to choose data architectures that systematically differ from those that are optimal from the user's point of view. In particular, we identify a class of pivot mechanisms, linking individual privacy to choices by others, which platforms prefer to implement and which make users significantly worse off

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31413
    Schlagworte: Digitale Plattform; Datenschutz; Datensicherheit; Externalities; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

  3. Too much data
    prices and inefficiencies in data markets
    Erschienen: September 2019
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 1 (26296)
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 26296
    Schlagworte: Digitale Plattform; Daten; Preis; Datenschutz; Wettbewerb; Theorie; data sharing
    Umfang: 50, 37 Seiten, Illustrationen
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