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  1. Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
    Autor*in: Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  [Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences], [West Lafayette, Indiana]

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: May 5, 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Purdue University Economics Department working paper ; no. 1332
    Schlagworte: Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; cooperation; optimism; belief elicitation; supergame strategies; experimentation; trust; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 108 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Non-common priors, incentives, and promotions
    the role of learning
    Autor*in: Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation contract in which the agent is only compensated for his effort if the extra profit materializes maximizes the principal's profits. In this optimal contract, the agent's principal-expected compensation decreases over time and learning exacerbates his exploitation, unless he has been revealed to be talented. Therefore, the principal's profits may increase with failures, and the agent may only be employed if his perceived talent is sufficiently low. As an application of these results, we analyse a firm's optimal promotion policy, and show that promotion to a new job may optimally be based on the agent being successful in a previous job, even if the agent's talent across jobs is entirely uncorrelated. This provides a novel explanation for the so-called "Peter Principle", for which Benson et al., 2019 have recently provided evidence in a setting with verifiable performance and highly confident workers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279230
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10481 (2023)
    Schlagworte: overconfidence; experimentation; dynamic incentives; Peter Principle
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Striking evidence
    the impact of railway strikes on competition from intercity bus services in Germany
    Autor*in: Beestermöller, Matthias Gerhard; Jessen-Thiesen, Levke; Sandkamp, Alexander-Nikolai
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper investigates the impact of the largest rail strikes in German history on intercity buses - a then newly liberalised market. Using unique booking data of bus services, we exploit variation in rail service cancellations across routes to show... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates the impact of the largest rail strikes in German history on intercity buses - a then newly liberalised market. Using unique booking data of bus services, we exploit variation in rail service cancellations across routes to show that the disruption in rail transport increases bus ticket sales. Crucially, the effect persists beyond the strike, indicating that travellers do not return to their originally preferred mode of transport. It is particularly pronounced for passengers travelling on weekends. The findings suggest that customers were previously under-experimenting. Beyond transportation, our results highlight the importance of service reliability, as temporary disruptions can cause customers to permanently switch to competitors.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279233
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10483 (2023)
    Schlagworte: experimentation; inter-modal substitution; learning; optimisation; strike; switching costs; transport
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen