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  1. Choosing a control group for displaced workers
    Autor*in: Krolikowski, Pawel M.
    Erschienen: February 2016
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, [Cleveland, OH]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Speicherung
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ; 16, 05
    Schlagworte: Displacement; earnings; control group; treatment event
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Employment dynamics in a signaling model with workers' incentives
    Autor*in: Weingarden, Alison
    Erschienen: September 28, 2016
    Verlag:  Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.

    Many firms adjust employment in a "lumpy" manner -- infrequently and in large bursts. In this paper, I show that lumpy adjustments can arise from concerns about the incentives of remaining workers. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm's... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Many firms adjust employment in a "lumpy" manner -- infrequently and in large bursts. In this paper, I show that lumpy adjustments can arise from concerns about the incentives of remaining workers. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm's productivity depends on its workers' effort and workers' income prospects depend on the firm's profitability. I use this model to analyze the consequences of demand shocks that are observed by the firm but not by its workers, who can only try to infer the firm's profitability from its employment decisions. I show that the resulting signaling model has pooling equilibria in which, for small negative shocks, the firm bears the costs of some labor hoarding in order to conceal negative information from workers and thus maintain their incentives for effort. However, if negative shocks accumulate then labor hoarding becomes too costly; at that point the firm drastically reduces employment

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Finance and economics discussion series ; 2017, 040
    FEDS Working Paper ; No. 2017-040
    Schlagworte: Asymmetric information; Displacement; Downsizing; Labor demand; Layoffs; Moral hazard; Signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen