Filtern nach
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 2 von 2.

  1. The political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutions
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, München

    In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. We explain why citizens do not exert enough... mehr

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    keine Fernleihe
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 445 (135)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. We explain why citizens do not exert enough political pressure to reduce corruption if financial institutions are missing. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. The mode of financing this entry fee determines the distribution of the rents from corruption. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Thus, the economic system has an effect on political outcomes. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94039
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 135
    Schlagworte: Corruption; Financial Markets; Institutions; Development; Voting
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([1], 31, [1] S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how... mehr

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    keine Fernleihe
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 445 (87)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93850
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 87
    Schlagworte: Information; Coordination; Industrialization; Development; Global Games; Equilibrium Refinements; Big Push
    Umfang: Online-Ressource ([2], 20 S.)