On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control
Abstract: "We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to...
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Abstract: "We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/ gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that take the influence activities into consideration." (author's abstract)
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Beschaffungsmarktforschung in der digitalen vernetzten Welt
Grundlagen, Analyse und Anwendungen
The effects of disclosure regulation on innovative firms: common values
Abstract: "Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals' beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms' disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare...
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Abstract: "Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals' beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms' disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under mandated disclosure in a model with perfect positive correlation among the firms' cost of investment. Under voluntary disclosure firms disclose bad news, and conceal good news to discourage their rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms typically expect higher profits for given information acquisition investments, but they acquire less information." (author's abstract)
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Learning from environmental actors about environmental developments: The case of international organizations
Abstract: "This article makes a case for viewing international governmental organizations (IOs) as corporate agents capable of learning. In doing so, it attempts to go beyond prevailing conceptions of IOs as means or settings for multilateral...
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Abstract: "This article makes a case for viewing international governmental organizations (IOs) as corporate agents capable of learning. In doing so, it attempts to go beyond prevailing conceptions of IOs as means or settings for multilateral negotiation and bargaining. The proposed theoretical framework argues from an organizational learning perspective. By integrating notions from neo-institutionalism and policyanalysis it tries to capture the impact of IOs' publicness on learning processes. The focus is on IOs' relations with stakeholders and constituencies for the development and implementation of transboundary policies. These interactions are seen as a means to learn about external demands, expectations and expertise. Their impact on the internal dynamics in IOs tends to be of a dual nature: enhanced adaptability in its margins and buffering the organizational core from environmental fluctuations. Hence, some skepticism is appropriate in assessing IOs' capacity to engage in profound cha
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Valuation of customers' word of mouth referrals
approach and first result
The effect of word of mouth on services switching decisions
perceived influence and actual choice
Learning from environmental actors about environmental developments
the case of international organizations
Avoiding the rating bounce
why rating agencies are slow to react to new information
