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  1. Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests
    Autor*in: Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 191
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak favorite or strong underdog may be induced to raise their efforts, i.e., show "dominant" or "defiant" reactions. To avert Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog. We also consider partial information release, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information design, correlation, and continuous types. Applications are discussed. The proofs employ novel arguments in monotone comparative statics and an improved version of Jensen's inequality.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228881
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 279
    Schlagworte: Asymmetric contests; incomplete information; disclosure; strategic complements and substitutes; dominance and defiance; Bayesian persuasion; Jensen's inequality; Spieltheorie; Ungerechtigkeit; Auskunft; Dominanz; Abweichendes Verhalten
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. From micro to macro: a note on the analysis of aggregate productivity dynamics using firm-level data
    Autor*in: Dias, Daniel; Marques, Carlos Robalo
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number 1314 (April 2021)
    Schlagworte: Jensen's inequality; productivity decomposition; geometric mean
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen