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  1. Communication under Ambiguity
    Autor*in: Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans
    Erschienen: 04 March 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to... mehr

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to disagree forever. Although the learning process converges, leading to common knowledge of the individual decisions, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity-free communication is a necessary and sufficient condition for a consensus to emerge. However, when communication is public, ambiguity-free communication is only sufficient for reaching a consensus. We apply our model to economic forecasting, providing an alternative account for persistently disagreeing forecasters. Finally, we outline an "advisor's dilemma" and explain why deliberation in democracy may never end.

     
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    Quelle: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18880
    Schlagworte: Ambiguity; beliefs; common prior; common knowledge; disagree-ment; consensus; communication; fair protocol; updating; learning; forecasting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)
  2. Consensos, disensos e ideología: el caso de los economistas en Uruguay
    Autor*in: Amarante, Verónica; Bucheli, Marisa; Lara, Cecilia
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  [Universidad de la República], [Montevideo, Uruguay]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Spanisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 20.500.12008/31716
    Schriftenreihe: Documentos de trabajo / dECON, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República ; no. 22, 03 (mayo 2022)
    Schlagworte: economists; consensus; opinions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Learning in canonical networks
    an experiment on large networks with real-world features
    Autor*in: Choi, Syngjoo; Goyal, Sanjeev; Moisan, Frederic; To, Yu Yang Tony
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, [Cambridge]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2235
    Janeway institute working paper series ; 2022, 12
    Schlagworte: social learning; social networks; experimental social science; consensus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Beyond the doomsday economics of "proof-of-work" in cryptocurrencies
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.
    Erschienen: January 2019
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 765
    Schlagworte: Cryptocurrencies; cryptoassets; digital currencies; blockchain; proof-of-work; proof-of-stake; distributed ledger technology; consensus; bitcoin; ethereum; money; digitalisation; finance; history of money
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    An earlier version of this paper was titled "The mechanics of decentralised trust in Bitcoin and the blockchain"
  5. Do the values of economists matter in the art of science of economics?
    Autor*in: Dalen, Hendrik P. van
    Erschienen: 29 January 2019
    Verlag:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER, Center for Economic Research ; no. 2019, 004
    Schlagworte: values; economists; public policy; consensus; methodology; gender
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Groundwork for social-ecological transformations
    the social contract, global governance and the meaning of time : constructive criticism of the WBGU report world in transition - a social contract for a great transformation
    Autor*in: Manstetten, Reiner; Kuhlmann, Andreas; Faber, Malte; Frick, Marc
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    A decade ago, the German Advisory Council to the Federal Government on Global Environmental Change (Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Bundesregierung für Globale Umweltveränderungen - WBGU) published its main report. This attempt to take stock in 2011... mehr

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    Standort:
    Evangelische Hochschule Freiburg, Hochschulbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    HeiBIB - Die Heidelberger Universitätsbibliographie
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    A decade ago, the German Advisory Council to the Federal Government on Global Environmental Change (Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Bundesregierung für Globale Umweltveränderungen - WBGU) published its main report. This attempt to take stock in 2011 made an impact and provided orientation on both a national and international scale. The WBGU report did not hold back: It aimed to show the urgent need for change in terms of sustainable development through the interplay of politics, economy, society and nature. The central message was: We need a "social contract for a Great Transformation", and it must be implemented by 2021. How is the report to be assessed today? We will summarise the positions of the WGBU report, cite its merits, and comment on them critically and constructively. Our approach examines the five main themes of the report: the global social contract; global governance using the example of the Paris Climate Agreement; acceptance by those involved and affected; the urgency of economic, political and social action; and the concept of the Great Transformation. In our critique, we suggest ways to constructively elaborate on the ideas laid out in the WBGU report, ideas that were not thought through to the end. Our focus lies particularly on how to deal with time and the concept of the Great Transformation. In doing so, we will also address the significance of technical advances, innovation and our own ignorance. The title of the report uses the term "Great Transformation" which acts as a leitmotif throughout. Put forth by Karl Polanyi (1941/44), this term, as used in the WBGU's parlance, is intended to address the far-reaching changes that a regulatory state would have to undertake, along with the participation of the global citizenry, in order to overcome the ecological crisis of the coming decades. In our conclusion, we argue that the idea of a uniformly planned and comprehensively attainable transformation of the current situation is inadequate. Instead, we have observed that different actors in different places have worked at different speeds not on a Great Transformation but on a multitude of social-ecological transformation processes. The effectiveness of such movements - which often emerge spontaneously - has grown to the present day. This gives us hope.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    hdl: 10419/234324
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 043 (05/2021)
    Schlagworte: Great Transformation; social-ecological transformation; global social contract; consensus; global governance; top-down/bottom-up approach; ignorance; temporal structures; technical progress; international climate policy; WBGU; Fridays for Future
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (18 Seiten)
  7. Distributed ledgers and the governance of money
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the... mehr

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    Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the equilibrium that supports this consensus depends on who has access to the ledger and how it can be updated. To find the optimal solution, Buterin's "scalability trilemma" needs to be addressed, so that a workable balance can be found between decentralization, security (i.e. a robust consensus), and scale (the efficient volume of transactions). Using a global game analysis of an exchange economy with credit, we solve for the optimal ledger design that balances the three objectives of this trilemma. We characterize the optimal number of validators, supermajority threshold, fees and transaction size. When intertemporal incentives are strong, a centralized ledger is always optimal. Otherwise, decentralization may be optimal, and validators need to be selected from the set of users of the system.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248986
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9441 (2021)
    Schlagworte: market design; money distributed ledger technology; DLT; blockchain; decentralized finance; global game; consensus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Interpersonal comparisons and concerns for expertise
    Autor*in: Andina-Díaz, Ascensión; García Martínez, José A.
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, [Málaga]

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    VS 511
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: THE, Teoría e historia económica working paper series ; WP 2020, 07 (November 2020)
    Schlagworte: Interpersonal comparisons; career concerns; probability of feedback; consensus; dissent
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. The virtuous cycle of agreement
    Autor*in: Louis, Philippos; Núñez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / University of Cyprus, Department of Economics ; 2019, 04
    Schlagworte: Gruppenentscheidung; Präferenztheorie; Experiment; implementation; mechanism design; consensus; agreement; congruence; experiment; endorsements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Beyond the doomsday economics of "proof-of-work" in cryptocurrencies
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.
    Erschienen: 04 February 2019
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP13506
    Schlagworte: cryptocurrencies; crypto-assets; digital currencies; blockchain; proof-of-work; proof-of-stake; distributed ledger technology; consensus; bitcoin; ethereum; money; digitalisation; inance; history of money
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Divided we stand?
    professional consensus and political conflict in academic economics
    Autor*in: Beyer, Karl M.; Pühringer, Stephan
    Erschienen: May 2019
    Verlag:  Cusanus Hochschule, Bernkastel-Kues

    In this paper we address the issue of the role of ideology and political preferences of publically engaged economists and contribute to the debate on consensus in economics. To do so, we conduct a social network analysis on the signatories of... mehr

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    In this paper we address the issue of the role of ideology and political preferences of publically engaged economists and contribute to the debate on consensus in economics. To do so, we conduct a social network analysis on the signatories of economist petitions, which we identify as one channel for economists to exert public influence. We base our analysis on 77 public policy petitions and presidential anti-/endorsement letters from 2008-2017 in the United States with more than 6,400 signatories and check the robustness of our results with six sub-networks. Our contribution is twofold: On the one hand we provide an extended empirical basis for the debate on consensus in economics and the role of politics and ideology in economics. On the other hand we provide a viable tool to trace the ideological leaning of (prospective) economist petitions and economists based on the social structure of petition networks.

     
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    hdl: 10419/206873
    Schriftenreihe: Working Paper Serie der Institute für Ökonomie und Philosophie ; Nr. Ök-51 (05 2019)
    Schlagworte: social network analysis; sociology of economics; consensus; public economists; economist petitions; United States
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Partial norms
    Autor*in: D'Adda, Giovanna; Dufwenberg, Martin; Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido Enrico
    Erschienen: 18 March 2019
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP13593
    Schlagworte: Social norms; partial norms; normative expectations; consensus; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. The power of the federal reserve chair
    Autor*in: Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francisco
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  CIREQ, Université de Montréal, Montréal (Québec)

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Schriftenreihe: Cahier / CIREQ, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative ; 2020, 20
    Schlagworte: Inclusive-voting; agenda-setting; consensus; FOMC; collective decision-making
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Permissioned distributed ledgers and the governance of money
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 924 (January 2021)
    Schlagworte: digital currencies; money; distributedledger; blockchain; coordination game; global game; consensus; market design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Distributed ledgers and the governance of money
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Study Center Gerzensee, Gerzensee

    Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the... mehr

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    Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the equilibrium that supports this consensus depends on who has access to the ledger and how it can be updated. Using a global game analysis of an exchange economy with credit, we solve for the optimal ledger design that balances security, scalability and decentralization. When intertemporal incentives are strong, a centralized ledger is always optimal. Otherwise, decentralization may be optimal.

     
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    hdl: 10419/247258
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Study Center Gerzensee ; 21, 01
    Schlagworte: digital currencies; money; distributed ledger; blockchain; coordination game; global game; consensus; market design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Permissioned distributed ledgers and the governance of money
    Autor*in: Auer, Raphael A.; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Bern, Switzerland

    We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus... mehr

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    We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game. Without giving proper incentives to validators, however, their records cannot be trusted because they cannot commit to verifying trades and they can accept bribes to incorrectly validate histories. Both frictions challenge the integrity of the ledger on which credit transactions rely. In this context, we examine the conditions under which the process of permissioned validation supports decentralized exchange as an equilibrium, and analyze the optimal design of the trade and validation mechanisms. We solve for the optimal fees, number of validators, supermajority threshold and transaction size. A stronger consensus mechanism requires higher rents be paid to validators. Our results suggest that a centralized ledger is likely to be superior, unless weaknesses in the rule of law and contract enforcement necessitate a decentralized ledger.

     
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    hdl: 10419/242852
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 21, 01 (January, 2021)
    Schlagworte: digital currencies; money; distributed ledger; blockchain; coordination game; global game; consensus; market design; Money demand; unit roots; cointegration; structural VARs; natural rate of interest
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Divided we stand?
    professional consensus and political conflict in academic economics
    Autor*in: Beyer, Karl M.; Pühringer, Stephan
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Linz

    In this paper we address the issue of the role of ideology and political preferences of publically engaged economists and contribute to the debate on consensus in economics. To do so, we conduct a social network analysis on the signatories of... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 589
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    In this paper we address the issue of the role of ideology and political preferences of publically engaged economists and contribute to the debate on consensus in economics. To do so, we conduct a social network analysis on the signatories of economist petitions, which we identify as one channel for economists to exert public influence. We base our analysis on a sample of 77 public policy petitions and presidential anti-/endorsement letters from 2008-2017 in the United States with more than 6,400 signatories and check the robustness of our results with six sub-networks. Our contribution is twofold: On the one hand we provide an extended empirical basis for the debate on consensus in economics and the role of politics and ideology in economics. On the other hand we provide a viable tool to trace the ideological leaning of (prospective) economist petitions and economists based on the social structure of petition networks.

     
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    hdl: 10419/196584
    Schriftenreihe: ICAE working paper series ; no. 94 (April 2019)
    Schlagworte: social network analysis; sociology of economics; consensus; public economists; economist petitions; United States
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Partial norms
    Autor*in: D'Adda, Giovanna; Dufwenberg, Martin; Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido Enrico
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance.... mehr

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    We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.

     
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/198928
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 7568 (March 2019)
    Schlagworte: social norms; partial norms; normative expectations; consensus; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Communication under Ambiguity
    Autor*in: Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans
    Erschienen: 04 March 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to... mehr

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
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    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to disagree forever. Although the learning process converges, leading to common knowledge of the individual decisions, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity-free communication is a necessary and sufficient condition for a consensus to emerge. However, when communication is public, ambiguity-free communication is only sufficient for reaching a consensus. We apply our model to economic forecasting, providing an alternative account for persistently disagreeing forecasters. Finally, we outline an "advisor's dilemma" and explain why deliberation in democracy may never end.

     
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    Quelle: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18880
    Schlagworte: Ambiguity; beliefs; common prior; common knowledge; disagree-ment; consensus; communication; fair protocol; updating; learning; forecasting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)
  20. Repeated majority voting
    Autor*in: Macé, Antonin; Treibich, Rafael
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  [Paris School of Economics], [Paris]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 331
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2024, 16
    Schlagworte: logrolling; repeated games; majority voting; preference intensities; consensus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Relative pricing and efficient allocation in blockchains
    Autor*in: Ndiaye, Abdoulaye
    Erschienen: November 2024
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper investigates how relative pricing schemes can achieve efficient allocations in blockchain systems featuring multiple transaction queues under a global capacity constraint. I model a capacity-constrained blockchain where users submit... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    This paper investigates how relative pricing schemes can achieve efficient allocations in blockchain systems featuring multiple transaction queues under a global capacity constraint. I model a capacity-constrained blockchain where users submit transactions to different queues—each representing a submarket with unique demand characteristics—and decide to participate based on posted prices and expected delays. I find that revenue maximization tends to allocate capacity to the highest-paying queue, whereas welfare maximization generally serves all queues. Optimal relative pricing of different queues depends on factors such as market size, demand elasticity, and the balance between local and global congestion. My results have implications for the implementation of local pricing for evolving blockchain architectures, including parallel transaction execution, directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based systems, and multiple concurrent proposers.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 11467 (2024)
    Schlagworte: blockchain; fintech; transactions; parallel execution; fee markets; consensus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  22. Confidence, consensus and aggregation
    Autor*in: Hill, Brian
    Erschienen: 2023
    Verlag:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    This paper develops and defends a new approach to belief aggregation, involving confidence in beliefs. It is characterised by a variant of the Pareto condition that enjoins respecting consensuses borne of compromise. Confidence aggregation recoups... mehr

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    This paper develops and defends a new approach to belief aggregation, involving confidence in beliefs. It is characterised by a variant of the Pareto condition that enjoins respecting consensuses borne of compromise. Confidence aggregation recoups standard probability aggregation rules, such as linear pooling, as special cases, whilst avoiding the spurious unanimity issues that have plagued such rules. Moreover, it generates a new family of probability aggregation rules that can faithfully accommodate within-person expertise diversity, hence resolving a longstanding challenge. Confidence aggregation also outperforms linear aggregation: the group beliefs it provides are closer to the truth, in expectation. Finally, confidence aggregation is dynamically rational: it commutes with update

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: HEC Paris Research Paper
    Schlagworte: Belief aggregation; confidence in beliefs; Pareto principle; linearpooling; spurious unanimity; expertise; consensus
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (76 p)
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    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 13, 2023 erstellt
  23. Economic and political governance in Germany's social market economy
    Autor*in: Siebert, Horst
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  IfW, Kiel

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  24. Economic and political governance in Germany's social market economy
    Autor*in: Siebert, Horst
    Erschienen: 2004
    Verlag:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

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  25. Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity
    Autor*in: Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim; Klößner, Stefan
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We present a model of opinion formation where individuals repeatedly engage in discussion and update their opinion in a social network similarly to the DeGroot model. Abstracting from the standard assumption that individuals always report their... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We present a model of opinion formation where individuals repeatedly engage in discussion and update their opinion in a social network similarly to the DeGroot model. Abstracting from the standard assumption that individuals always report their opinion truthfully, agents in our model may state an opinion that differs from their true opinion. The incentive to do so is induced by agents' preferences for conformity. We model opinion formation as a dynamic process and identify conditions for convergence to a consensus. Studying the consensus in detail, we show that an agent's social influence on the consensus opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in the level of conformity. Thus, lower conformity fosters opinion leadership. Moreover, assuming that the initial opinion is a noisy signal about some true state of the world, we study how conformity affects the efficiency of information aggregation or the ``wisdom'' of the society. We show that the society becomes wiser, in the sense of a smaller mean squared error of their estimate, if players who are well informed (relative to their network importance) are less conform, while uninformed players (relative to their network importance) conform more with their neighbors.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79770
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Schlagworte: opinion leadership; wisdom of crowds; consensus; social networks; conformity; eigenvector centrality
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (36 S.), graph. Darst.