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  1. Why do countries form regions? The political economy of regional integration
  2. Biased forecasts to affect voting decisions?
    the Brexit case
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to in uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 261
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    This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to in uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future states of the economy and have to rely on macroeconomic forecasters. The model predicts that it is optimal for forecasters with economic interest (stakes) and in uence to publish biased forecasts prior to a referendum. We test our theory using high-frequency data at the forecaster level surrounding the Brexit referendum. The results show that forecasters with stakes and in uence released much more pessimistic estimates for GDP growth in the following year than other forecasters. Actual GDP growth rate in 2017 shows that forecasters with stakes and in uence were also more incorrect than other institutions and the propaganda bias explains up to 50 percent of their forecast error.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/197673
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University ; 2019, 4
    Schlagworte: Brexit; Interest Groups; Forecasters Behavior; Voting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Trade in trash
    a political economy approach
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  CIRANO, [Montréal]

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cahier scientifique / CIRANO ; 2020s, 44
    Schlagworte: Trade in Trash; Interest Groups; Externalities; Environmental Lobby; Political Economy; Trade and Environment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  4. Equilibrium reforms and endogenous complexity
    Erschienen: 06 August 2020
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP15136
    Schlagworte: Information; Regulatory Complexity; Competence; Interest Groups; Politicians; Bureaucracy; Checks and Balances; Incremental Reforms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Biased forecasts to affect voting decisions?
    the Brexit case
    Erschienen: March 2019
    Verlag:  Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm

    This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 204
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future states of the economy and have to rely on macroeconomic forecasters. The model predicts that it is optimal for forecasters with economic interest (stakes) and influence to publish biased forecasts prior to a referendum. We test our theory using high-frequency data at the forecaster level surrounding the Brexit referendum. The results show that forecasters with stakes and influence released much more pessimistic estimates for GDP growth in the following year than other forecasters. Actual GDP growth rate in 2017 shows that forecasters with stakes and influence were also more incorrect than other institutions and the propaganda bias explains up to 50 percent of their forecast error.

     

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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/215442
    Schriftenreihe: Sveriges Riksbank working paper series ; 364
    Schlagworte: Brexit; Interest Groups; Forecasters Behavior; Voting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Political economic drivers of real exchange rate levels
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst

    Voluminous theoretical and empirical research shows that real exchange rate (RER) undervaluation could be conducive to economic development. Why do countries then often avoid the pursuit of policies that facilitate undervaluation or even... mehr

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    DS 179
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    Voluminous theoretical and empirical research shows that real exchange rate (RER) undervaluation could be conducive to economic development. Why do countries then often avoid the pursuit of policies that facilitate undervaluation or even intentionally pursue RER overvaluation? We address this question by investigating the economic/structural, institutional/political, and policy factors that explain the within-country variation in RER undervaluation in a baseline panel of 68 developing and 39 developed countries between 1988 and 2012 using OLS and GMM estimators. Our results indicate that the sectoral structure of the economy, functional distribution of income, the dependence of exports on imported inputs, the degree of central bank independence, balance sheet vulnerabilities, and technological sophistication are important determinants of RER levels. Our key results are robust to using alternative measures, estimation techniques, different samples, and additional control variables.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267003
    Schriftenreihe: Economics Department working paper series ; 2022, 13
    Schlagworte: Exchange Rate Policy; Real Exchange Rate Misalignment; Interest Groups; Import Dependence; Central Bank Independence
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Why do countries form regions?
    the political economy of regional integration
  8. Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union
    a political-economy perspective on EMU
    Erschienen: 1994

    Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that monetary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are... mehr

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 421 (238)
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that monetary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetaiy Union (EMU) while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/101558
    Schlagworte: European Monetaiy Union; Interest Groups; Banking Policy; Bank Cooperation
    Umfang: 17 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Literaturverz. S. 16 - 17