The unified social tax and its impact on social policy in Putin's Russia
Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Einführung der einheitlichen Sozialsteuer in Russland. Die Autoren fragen nach den wichtigsten Veränderungen in den Bereichen der Finanzierung von Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen und danach, wie sich...
mehr
|
Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Einführung der einheitlichen Sozialsteuer in Russland. Die Autoren fragen nach den wichtigsten Veränderungen in den Bereichen der Finanzierung von Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen und danach, wie sich diese Veränderungen auf die sozialpolitischen Reformen bei den Pensionen, dem Gesundheitswesen und der Beschäftigungspolitik auswirken. Im ersten Abschnitt wird das Vermächtnis der Jeltsin-Ära beschrieben, das den Ausgangspunkt für die zweite Welle von sozialpolitischen Reformen markiert. Abschnitt zwei gibt einen Überblick über die neu eingeführte Sozialsteuer und die damit verbundene politische Debatte. Diese neue Methode des Sammelns von Sozialbeiträgen beeinflusst direkt drei Bereiche der Sozialpolitik, nämlich Pensionen, Gesundheit und Beschäftigung. In Abschnitt drei umreißen die Autoren gegenwärtige Reformen in jedem dieser drei Felder. Der letzte Abschnitt fasst die wichtigsten Ergebnisse zusammen und wertet die Implikationen der einheitliche
|
Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution
Abstract: "We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a 'good jobs'...
mehr
|
Abstract: "We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a 'good jobs' sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high." (author's abstract)
|
Education, redistributive taxation and confidence
Abstract: "We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive...
mehr
|
Abstract: "We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the overconfident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals." (author's abstract)
|
