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  1. Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament
    Autor*in: Fertő, Imre; Kóczy, László Á.; Kovács, Attila; Sziklai, Balázs R.
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    We aim to identify the most influential members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (COMAGRI). Unlike previous studies that were based on case studies or interviews with stakeholders, we analyse the voting power of MEPs using a... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 151
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    We aim to identify the most influential members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (COMAGRI). Unlike previous studies that were based on case studies or interviews with stakeholders, we analyse the voting power of MEPs using a spatial Banzhaf power index. We identify critical members: members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that rapporteurs, EP group coordinators and MEPs from countries with high relative Committee representations, such as Ireland, Poland or Romania are powerful actors. Italy emerges as the most influential member state, while France seems surprisingly weak.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237558
    Schriftenreihe: CERS-IE working papers ; CERS-IE WP - 2021, 14 (March 2021)
    Schlagworte: European Parliament; Common Agricultural Policy; voting games; Banzhaf index; voting game over a convex geometry
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
    = Transzferprofit és externáliák modellezése földgáz hálózatokon, kooperatív játékelméleti keretben
    Autor*in: Csercsik, Dávid; Hubert, Franz; Sziklai, Balázs R.; Kóczy, László Á.
    Erschienen: February 2019
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access... mehr

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    Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "externalities", the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine’s power index as a major transit country.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222051
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2019, 4
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Does risk sorting explain bubbles?
    = Magyarázza-e a kockázatkereső magatartás a tőzsdebuborékok kialakulását?
    Autor*in: Kiss, Hubert J.; Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Ágnes; Sziklai, Balázs R.
    Erschienen: February 2019
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    A recent stream of experimental economics literature studies the factors that contribute to the emergence of financial bubbles. We consider a setting where participants sorted according to their degree of risk aversion trade in experimental asset... mehr

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    A recent stream of experimental economics literature studies the factors that contribute to the emergence of financial bubbles. We consider a setting where participants sorted according to their degree of risk aversion trade in experimental asset markets. We show that risk sorting is able to explain bubbles partially: Markets with the most risk-tolerant traders exhibit larger bubbles than markets with the most risk averse traders. In our study risk aversion does not correlate with gender or cognitive abilities, so it is an additional factor that helps understand bubbles.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222052
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2019, 5
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Ranking institutions within a discipline
    the steep mountain of academic excellence
    Autor*in: Sziklai, Balázs R.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    We present a novel algorithm to rank smaller academic entities such as university departments or research groups within a research discipline. The Weighted Top Candidate (WTC) algorithm is a generalisation of an expert identification method. The... mehr

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    We present a novel algorithm to rank smaller academic entities such as university departments or research groups within a research discipline. The Weighted Top Candidate (WTC) algorithm is a generalisation of an expert identification method. The axiomatic characterisation of WTC shows why it is especially suitable for scientometric purposes. The key axiom is stability - the selected institutions support each other's membership. The WTC algorithm, upon receiving an institution citation matrix, produces a list of institutions that can be deemed experts of the field. With a parameter we can adjust how exclusive our list should be. By completely relaxing the parameter, we obtain the largest stable set - academic entities that can qualify as experts under the mildest conditions. With a strict setup, we obtain a short list of the absolute elite. We demonstrate the algorithm on a citation database compiled from game theoretic literature published between 2008-2017. By plotting the size of the stable sets with respect to exclusiveness, we can obtain an overview of the competitiveness of the field. The diagram hints at how difficult it is for an institution to improve its position.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237550
    Schriftenreihe: CERS-IE working papers ; CERS-IE WP - 2021, 6 (January 2021)
    Schlagworte: University departments; Ranking; Weighted Top Candidate method; Research discipline
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Apportionment and districting by sum of ranking differences
    = Választókörzetek kiosztása és kialakítása rangkülönbségek összegével
    Autor*in: Sziklai, Balázs R.; Héberger, Károly
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks competing solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both possibilities.... mehr

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    Sum of Ranking Differences is an innovative statistical method that ranks competing solutions based on a reference point. The latter might arise naturally, or can be aggregated from the data. We provide two case studies to feature both possibilities. Apportionment and districting are two critical issues that emerge in relation to democratic elections. Theoreticians invented clever heuristics to measure malapportionment and the compactness of the shape of the constituencies, yet, there is no unique best method in either cases. Using data from Norway and the US we rank the standard methods both for the apportionment and for the districting problem. In case of apportionment, we find that all the classical methods perform reasonably well, with subtle but significant differences. By a small margin the Leximin method emerges as a winner, but - somewhat unexpectedly - the nonregular Imperiali method ties for first place. In districting, the Lee-Sallee index and a novel parametric method the so-called Mo ent Invariant performs the best, although the latter is sensitive to the function's chosen parameter.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222078
    Schriftenreihe: CERS-IE working papers ; CERS-IE WP - 2020, 9 (February 2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen