Results for %2A

Displaying results 1 to 25 of 38.

  1. Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem... more

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    This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time-consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile. Extortionary governments' incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish; instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility-increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time-consistent extortionary taxation, but introduces other distortions that reduce workers' utility.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 703
    Subjects: Bildungsinvestition; Einkommensteuer; Bildungspolitik; Arbeitsmigranten; Steuerwettbewerb; Leviathan-Modell; Bildungsfinanzierung; Globalisierung; Theorie
    Scope: 22 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 20 - 22

    Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/703.pdf

  2. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
    Zsn 58547-2002,19
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    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-19
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 18 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  3. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.], Munich

    Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is... more

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    Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

     

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 825
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 18 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 17 - 18

  4. Terrorism and the state
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "This paper considers terrorism as an extortion activity. It uses tools from the theory of extortion and from conflict theory to describe how terrorism works, why terrorism is a persistent phenomenon, why terrorism is a violent phenomenon,... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper considers terrorism as an extortion activity. It uses tools from the theory of extortion and from conflict theory to describe how terrorism works, why terrorism is a persistent phenomenon, why terrorism is a violent phenomenon, and how retaliation affects the outcome. The analysis highlights the importance of information aspects and discusses some aspects of the organizational design." (author's abstract)

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11277
    DDC Categories: 320; 320; 900
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-15
    Subjects: Terrorismus; Organisiertes Verbrechen; Glaubwürdigkeit; Kriminalpolitik; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Terrorismus; (stw)Organisierte Kriminalität; (stw)Glaubwürdigkeit; (stw)Kriminalpolitik; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Öffentlichkeit; (thesoz)Erpressung; (thesoz)historische Entwicklung; (thesoz)Organisationsform; (thesoz)Kriminalpolitik; (thesoz)Gewalt; (thesoz)Nahost; (thesoz)Islam; (thesoz)Ziel; (thesoz)Terrorismus; (thesoz)Mittelalter; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 20 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

  5. Adaptation, mitigation and risk-taking in climate policy
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a... more

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    The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries. -- climate change ; adaptation ; mitigation ; risk-taking

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/46481
    Series: Array ; 3320
    Subjects: Klimawandel; Umweltpolitik; Immissionsschutz; Politische Entscheidung
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: S., 554 KB), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen

  6. Terrorism and the state
  7. Investment in the absence of property rights
    the role of incumbency advantages
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 698
    Subjects: Investition; Investitionsmodell; Sachenrecht; Anreiz; LEN-Modell; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Investition; (stw)Betriebliche Investitionstheorie; (stw)Sachenrecht; (stw)Anreiz; (stw)Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; (stw)Theorie; Investments; Right of property; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Investments; Right of property; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 20 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar. - Literaturverz. S. 17 - 20

  8. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 825 : Category 1, Public finance
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Altruismus; (stw)Wettbewerb; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Neid; (stw)Nichtkooperatives Spiel; (stw)Evolutionäre Spieltheorie; Arbeitspapier; Online-Publikation; Buch; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 18 S., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar

  9. Investment in the absence of property rights
    the role of incumbency advantages
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Univ., Center for Economic Studies, Munich

    In many situations the indivaduals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the... more

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    bc 1391-698
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    In many situations the indivaduals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Array ; 698
    Subjects: Investition; Betriebliche Investitionstheorie; Sachenrecht; Anreiz; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Theorie
    Scope: 20 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 17 - 20

    Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/698.pdf

  10. Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-25
    Subjects: Multinationales Unternehmen; Eigentümerstruktur; Oligopol; Internationaler Wettbewerb; Strategische Handelspolitik; Theorie; Portfoliodiversifikation
    Scope: 11 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  11. Inverse campaigning
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-29
    Subjects: Konflikt; Signalling; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Wahlverhalten; Theorie; Wahlkampf
    Scope: 17 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  12. Taxation and education investment in the tertiary sector
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-17
    Subjects: Bildungsinvestition; Bildungsfinanzierung; Steuerbelastung; Zeitkonsistenz; Staatsversagen; Arbeitsmigranten
    Scope: 21 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  13. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: December 2002
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is... more

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    Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/76430
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; no. 825
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung ; 2002,19
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Altruismus; (stw)Wettbewerb; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Neid; (stw)Nichtkooperatives Spiel; (stw)Evolutionäre Spieltheorie; Arbeitspapier; Online-Publikation; Buch; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 18 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
  15. Altruism and envy in contests
    an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-19
    Subjects: Altruismus; Wettbewerb; Theorie; Neid; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
    Scope: 18 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  16. Inverse campaigning
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are... more

     

    Abstract: "It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much." (author's abstract)

     

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11307
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 320; 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-29
    Subjects: Konflikt; Signaling; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Wahlverhalten; Theorie; Wahlkampf
    Other subjects: (stw)Konflikt; (stw)Signalling; (stw)Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Informationsverhalten; (thesoz)Informationsvermittlung; (thesoz)Wirkung; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Implementation; (thesoz)politisches Programm; (thesoz)Kampagne; (thesoz)politische Kommunikation; Wahlprogramm; Arbeitspapier; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Buch; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 17 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

  17. The lifeboat problem
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

    We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then... more

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    We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen ("a seat"). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria. -- All-pay contest ; multiple prizes ; rent dissipation ; lifeboat

     

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/54592
    Series: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Politics, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism ; SP II 2011-106
    Subjects: Extensives Spiel; Dynamisches Spiel; Rent-Seeking; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 20 S., 660,63 KB), graph. Darst.
  18. Taxation and education investment in the tertiary sector
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-17
    Subjects: Bildungsinvestition; Bildungsfinanzierung; Steuerbelastung; Zeitkonsistenz; Staatsversagen; Arbeitsmigranten
    Scope: 21 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  19. Inverse campaigning
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-29
    Subjects: Konflikt; Signalling; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Wahlverhalten; Theorie; Wahlkampf
    Scope: 17 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  20. Search costs and corporate income tax competition
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation ; 11,03
    Subjects: Unternehmensbesteuerung; Steuerwettbewerb; Steuerplanung; Informationskosten; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; Steuertarif; Besteuerungsverfahren; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 5 S.)
  21. Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
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    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02,01
    Subjects: Bildungsinvestition; Einkommensteuer; Bildungspolitik; Arbeitsmigranten; Steuerwettbewerb; Leviathan-Modell; Bildungsfinanzierung; Globalisierung; Theorie
    Scope: 22 S, 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 20 - 22

  22. Delay in contests
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

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    97/459 B-02,20
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-20
    Subjects: Verhaltensökonomik; Entscheidung; Spieltheorie
    Scope: 13 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  23. Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Berlin

    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion papers / WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie ; 02-25
    Subjects: Multinationales Unternehmen; Eigentümerstruktur; Oligopol; Internationaler Wettbewerb; Strategische Handelspolitik; Theorie; Portfoliodiversifikation
    Scope: 11 S
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache

  24. Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

    This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 315 (2011,105)
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    This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism. -- Alliances ; contests ; conflict ; in-group favoritism

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/54590
    Series: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Politics, Research Professorship & Project The Future of Fiscal Federalism ; SP II 2011-105
    Subjects: Militärbündnis; Extensives Spiel; Politischer Konflikt; Soziale Gruppe; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 18 S., 664,84 KB), graph. Darst.
  25. Inverse campaigning