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  1. Profit shifting and equilibrium principles of international taxation
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a two-country model, allowing multinational firms to use transfer pricing to allocate profits across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash... more

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    We study the choice between source-based and destination-based corporate taxes in a two-country model, allowing multinational firms to use transfer pricing to allocate profits across tax jurisdictions. We show that source-based taxation is a Nash equilibrium for tax revenue maximizing jurisdictions if domestic and foreign firms generate large revenues. We also show that destination-based taxes are a Nash equilibrium when firms generate low revenues, which implies the presence of multiple equilibria. Both the source and the destination principle coexist in equilibrium when domestic and foreign corporate revenues are intermediate. However, the source principle always tax-dominates the destination principle.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/245392
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9211 (2021)
    Subjects: tax competition; multinational firms; corporate taxes; transfer pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Convergence of tax mixes in 29 OECD countries, 1980-2018
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Leiden

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    hdl: 1887/135550
    Series: Department of Economics research memorandum / Faculty of Law, Leiden University ; 2019, 02
    Subjects: convergence; tax mix; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The impact of tax and infrastructure competition on the profitability of local firms
    Published: November 2020
    Publisher:  Banque centrale du Luxembourg, Luxembourg

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    Series: Working paper / Banque centrale du Luxembourg ; no 149
    Subjects: Local firms; multinational firms; tax competition; infrastructure competition; tax harmonization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten)
  4. The internet as a tax haven?
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    If online transactions are tax-free, increased online shopping may lower tax rates as jurisdictions seek to reduce tax avoidance; but, if online firms remit taxes, online sales may put upward pressure on tax rates because internet sales help enforce... more

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    If online transactions are tax-free, increased online shopping may lower tax rates as jurisdictions seek to reduce tax avoidance; but, if online firms remit taxes, online sales may put upward pressure on tax rates because internet sales help enforce destination-based taxes. I find that higher internet penetration generally results in lower municipal tax rates, but raises tax rates in some jurisdictions. The latter effect emerges in states where many online vendors remit taxes. A one standard deviation increase in internet penetration lowers local sales taxes in large municipalities by 0.15 percentage points or 16% of the average rate.

     

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    hdl: 10419/235294
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8924 (2021)
    Subjects: e-commerce; online shopping; sales tax; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Tax competition with intermunicipal cooperation
    Published: September 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study local tax competition when municipalities can voluntarily cooperate. We compare the intensity of interjurisdictional policy interdependence between competing municipalities within the same “establishment for inter-municipal cooperation”... more

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    We study local tax competition when municipalities can voluntarily cooperate. We compare the intensity of interjurisdictional policy interdependence between competing municipalities within the same “establishment for inter-municipal cooperation” (EIMC) and competing municipalities outside of the cooperative unit. To resolve the endogeneity of the decision to cooperate we apply the approach of Kelejian and Piras (2014). The strategic response to the average tax rate among peer members of the same EIMC is less intense than the response to the average tax rate of municipalities outside of the cooperative unit. A one percentage point decrease in the average tax rate of non-members lowers the own-jurisdiction tax rate by 0.58 percentage points, while a one unit decrease in the tax rate of towns within the EIMC lowers the own-jurisdiction rate by 0.31 percentage points. Our empirical methods can be used to study strategic interactions within other cooperative groups, including supra-national institutions such as the European Union.

     

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    hdl: 10419/305576
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11334 (2024)
    Subjects: tax competition; intermunicipal cooperation; spatial autoregressive models; endogenous weight matrix; local public finance; networks
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Tax policies in a transition to a knowledge-based economy
    the effective tax burden of companies and highly skilled labour
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    Globalisation and the fast-approaching digitalisation increase capital as well as labour mobility fostering tax competition among countries worldwide. Based on a unique dataset, we analyse the development of effective tax burdens on corporations and... more

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    Globalisation and the fast-approaching digitalisation increase capital as well as labour mobility fostering tax competition among countries worldwide. Based on a unique dataset, we analyse the development of effective tax burdens on corporations and highly skilled labour for 26 OECD countries over the last decade. The synthesis of both indicators allows us to identify tax strategies of the countries considered and to further elaborate on the scope of future tax competition against the background of current developments. Overall, we find a declining trend in effective tax burdens on corporate investments, whereas we observe increases in the top statutory tax rates for high-income earners and a rather constant average effective tax burden on labour for a disposable income of EUR 100’000. Current developments like the agreement on a global minimum tax or the transition to a knowledge-based economy can set a new lower bound to tax competition on corporate investments and might shift its focus.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    hdl: 10419/248850
    Edition: This version: 29 October 2021
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 096 (12/2021)
    Subjects: effective tax rates; tax competition; location attractiveness; corporate location decision; Devereux/Griffith Methodology; Human Resource Tax Analyzer
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Tax competition with two tax instruments
    and tax evasion
    Published: September 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of... more

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    We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition may still be constrained-efficient (in the sense that there is no scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination). This is the case if the marginal social costs of underreporting savings and investment income are equal. The model demonstrates that, if source-based taxes on capital are inefficiently low, as is often assumed, taxes on savings must be inefficiently high. Constrained-efficient tax policy minimizes the social cost of underreporting. The results are robust to introducing taxes on profit or on labor income, if these types of income can be underreported as well. We conclude that commonly held assumptions on the need for coordination under tax competition need to be revised or qualified.

     

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    hdl: 10419/245499
    Edition: This version September 20, 2021
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9318 (2021)
    Subjects: tax competition; social welfare; tax coordination
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Why minimum corporate income taxation can make the high-tax countries worse off
    the compliance dilemma
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    hdl: 2078.1/249988
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2021, 10
    Subjects: profit shifting; tax competition; tax enforcement
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 16 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Second-best source-based taxation of multinational firms
    Published: September 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    I consider a continuum of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which differ in profitability. MNEs employ capital, shift profit to tax havens and may relocate their production facilities to other countries. Source countries provide public inputs and... more

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    I consider a continuum of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which differ in profitability. MNEs employ capital, shift profit to tax havens and may relocate their production facilities to other countries. Source countries provide public inputs and levy taxes. I derive optimal policy choices for different government objectives (to maximize tax revenue, national income or the representative household’s utility) allowing for an unrestricted set of tax policy instruments - in contrast to most existing work on corporate taxation. With observable productivity types, source governments set type-dependent lump-sum taxes and attain the first-best allocation. With unobservable productivity types, the optimum source-based tax system consists of a small lump-sum tax (driving low-profit types out of the market) and positive marginal taxes on reported profit. Optimal marginal tax rates on capital inputs are positive if more profitable firms employ more capital. Optimal public inputs are lower than in the first best if they are of higher value to more profitable firm types. I use a sufficient statistics approach (following Saez 2001) to express optimal tax and input choices as functions of elasticities of observable choice variables. Finally, I use the model to evaluate tax policy measures, e.g. the introduction of an effective minimum tax on profits in tax havens, and to derive the welfare properties of tax competition with an unrestricted set of tax instruments.

     

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    hdl: 10419/245510
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9329 (2021)
    Subjects: corporate taxation; multinational firms; optimum taxation; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Are incentive effects from fiscal equalization underestimated?
    evidence from a Swiss reform
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Université de Lausanne, Faculté des hautes études commerciales (HEC), Département d'économie, Lausanne

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    Series: Cahier de recherches économiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie ; 21, 13
    Subjects: fiscal equalization; tax competition; local public finance; fiscal federalism; regional science
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Does inter-local cooperation reduce the intensity of tax competition?
    evidence on inter-local industrial parks in Germany
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg

    We ask whether inter-municipal cooperation serve as a platform by which municipalities coor-dinate tax policies and reduce the intensity of tax competition. In this paper, we focus on inter-municipal cooperation in form of inter-local industrial... more

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    We ask whether inter-municipal cooperation serve as a platform by which municipalities coor-dinate tax policies and reduce the intensity of tax competition. In this paper, we focus on inter-municipal cooperation in form of inter-local industrial parks. We apply the generalized syn-thetic control method to analyze the causal impact of inter-local industrial parks on municipal tax-setting behavior using data on municipalities from four West-German states between 2000 and 2018. The analysis does not support the notion that inter-local industrial parks constitute a platform used for tax coordination.

     

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    hdl: 10419/254232
    Edition: This version: October 15, 2021
    Series: Joint discussion paper series in economics ; no. 2021, 37
    Subjects: Inter-local industrial parks; inter-municipal cooperation; tax competition; generalized synthetic control method; Germany
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue... more

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    The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on the induced strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect of the GMT is a reduction in profit shifting, which has a positive effect on revenues in high-tax countries as their tax base grows, and makes higher taxes attractive. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting real foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We argue that the revenue effects of the GMT depend on the instruments governments use to attract firms. With endogenous corporate tax rates, revenues in non-havens increase if initially tax competition among non-havens is fierce. By contrast, when governments compete via lump sum subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies.

     

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    hdl: 10419/252140
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9623 (2022)
    Subjects: global minimum tax; tax competition; OECD BEPS; Pillar II
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  13. Pareto-improving minimum corporate taxation
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The recent international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the... more

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    The recent international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the strategic responses to a minimum tax, which the policy objective being to change the rules of tax competition game are critical for assessing the design and welfare impact of, and prospects for, this fundamental policy innovation. Analysis and calibration plausibly suggest sizable scope for minima that are Pareto-improving, benefiting low tax countries as well as high tax, relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium.

     

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    hdl: 10419/252150
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9633 (2022)
    Subjects: tax competition; minimum taxation; corporate tax reform; international taxation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Tax policies in a transition to a knowledge-based economy
    the effective tax burden of companies and highly skilled labour
    Published: 12/2021
    Publisher:  ZEW, Mannheim

    Globalisation and the fast-approaching digitalisation increase capital as well as labour mobility fostering tax competition among countries worldwide. Based on a unique dataset, we analyse the development of effective tax burdens on corporations and... more

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    2 : Z 2027:2021,096
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    Badische Landesbibliothek
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    Globalisation and the fast-approaching digitalisation increase capital as well as labour mobility fostering tax competition among countries worldwide. Based on a unique dataset, we analyse the development of effective tax burdens on corporations and highly skilled labour for 26 OECD countries over the last decade. The synthesis of both indicators allows us to identify tax strategies of the countries considered and to further elaborate on the scope of future tax competition against the background of current developments. Overall, we find a declining trend in effective tax burdens on corporate investments, whereas we observe increases in the top statutory tax rates for high-income earners and a rather constant average effective tax burden on labour for a disposable income of EUR 100’000. Current developments like the agreement on a global minimum tax or the transition to a knowledge-based economy can set a new lower bound to tax competition on corporate investments and might shift its focus.

     

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    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH ; No. 21-096
    Subjects: effective tax rates; tax competition; location attractiveness; corporate location decision; Devereux/Griffith Methodology; Human Resource Tax Analyzer
    Scope: 51 Seiten, Diagramme
  15. Property tax competition
    a quantitative assessment
    Published: Sptember 2022
    Publisher:  [CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo], [Tokyo]

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    Series: Array ; CIRJE-F-1199
    Subjects: property taxes; tax competition; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    The OECD's proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decline of corporate tax rates. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect from less profit shifting increases... more

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    The OECD's proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decline of corporate tax rates. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect from less profit shifting increases revenues in high-tax countries. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We show that when governments compete via firm-specific or uniform subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies. When competition is by tax rates, revenues may increase however.

     

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    hdl: 10419/271962
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10318 (2023)
    Subjects: global minimum tax; tax competition; OECD BEPS; Pillar II
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Attracting profit shifting or fostering innovation?
    on patent boxes and RD subsidies
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes... more

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    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies non-cooperatively, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy, whereas the patent box tax rate is targeted at attracting international profit shifting. In equilibrium, patent box regimes emerge endogenously under policy competition, but never under policy coordination. We also compare the competition for mobile patents with the competition for mobile R&D units and show that enforcing a nexus principle is likely to reduce the aggressiveness of patent box regimes.

     

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    hdl: 10419/282028
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 336 (September 9, 2022)
    Subjects: corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten)
  18. A global minimum tax for large firms only
    implications for tax competition
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  RIETI, [Tokyo, Japan]

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    Series: RIETI discussion paper series ; 24-E, 051 (April 2024)
    Subjects: multinational firms; tax avoidance; global minimum tax; profit shifting; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. A global minimum tax for large firms only
    implications for tax competition
    Published: April 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    The Global Minimum Tax (GMT) is applied only to firms above a certain size threshold, permitting countries to set differential tax rates for small and large firms. We analyse tax competition between a tax haven and a non-haven country for... more

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    The Global Minimum Tax (GMT) is applied only to firms above a certain size threshold, permitting countries to set differential tax rates for small and large firms. We analyse tax competition between a tax haven and a non-haven country for heterogeneous multinationals to evaluate the effects of this partial coverage of GMT. We show that the introduction of a moderate GMT increases tax revenues in both the haven and the non-haven countries. Gradual increases in the GMT rate, however, induce the haven to set a discriminatory, lower tax rate on small multinationals, causing revenues in the non-haven country to decline at the switch of regimes. We also discuss the quantitative effects of introducing GMT in a calibrated version of our model.

     

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/296176
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11087 (2024)
    Subjects: multinational firms; tax avoidance; Global Minimum Tax; profit shifting; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. A global minimum tax for large firms only
    implications for tax competition
    Published: April 2024
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11094/95432
    Series: Discussion papers in economics and business ; 24, 06
    Subjects: multinational firms; tax avoidance; profit shifting; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Mobility responses to special tax regimes for the super-rich
    evidence from Switzerland
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We use a novel rich-list data set to estimate the sensitivity of the location choice of superrich foreigners to a special tax regime, under which wealthy foreigners are taxed on their living expenses, rather than their true income and wealth. We are... more

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    We use a novel rich-list data set to estimate the sensitivity of the location choice of superrich foreigners to a special tax regime, under which wealthy foreigners are taxed on their living expenses, rather than their true income and wealth. We are the first to evaluate this controversial Swiss policy, and show that when some Swiss cantons abolished this practice, their stock of superrich foreigners dropped by 43% as a consequence. We find no response for the Swiss super-rich, who were unaffected by the policy change.

     

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    hdl: 10419/300021
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11093 (2024)
    Subjects: super-rich; location-choice; tax mobility; expenditure-based taxation; preferential taxation; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Taxing capital and labor when both factors are imperfectly mobile internationally
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2019, 52
    Subjects: tax competition; globalization; imperfect factor mobility
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. The impact of profit shifting on economic activity and tax competition
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, DC]

    A growing empirical literature has documented significant profit shifting activities by multinationals. This paper looks at the impact of such profit shifting on real activity and tax competition. Real activity can be affected as profit shifting... more

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    A growing empirical literature has documented significant profit shifting activities by multinationals. This paper looks at the impact of such profit shifting on real activity and tax competition. Real activity can be affected as profit shifting changes-and theoretically most likely reduces-the cost of capital. Tax competition, even over real capital, is affected, because a permissive attitude toward profit shifting can be seen as a selective tax reduction for multinationals. Tightening profit shifting rules in turn can affect tax competition through the main rate. This paper discusses these issues theoretically and with the help of a simulation to assess the impact of profit-shifting on investment, revenues, and government behavior. Using the theoretical framework, it also provides a brief overview of the related empirical literature

     

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  24. Ertragsabhängige und ertragsunabhängige Steuern
    Forschungsauftrag Nr. 21/06 des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen = Income-dependent and income-independent taxation
    Published: [2008]
    Publisher:  Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut an der Universität zu Köln, Köln

    Die Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhältnis ertragsabhängiger und ertragsunabhängiger Steuern in Deutschland und in der OECD. Üblich ist die Unterscheidung zwischen direkten und indirekten Steuern. Abweichend davon orientieren wir uns an der... more

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    Die Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhältnis ertragsabhängiger und ertragsunabhängiger Steuern in Deutschland und in der OECD. Üblich ist die Unterscheidung zwischen direkten und indirekten Steuern. Abweichend davon orientieren wir uns an der Frage, in welchem Ausmaß die Besteuerung von im Ertragssinne produktiven Aktivitäten abhängt und welche Rolle andere, ertragsunabhängige Steuern spielen. Die EA-EUAPerspektive ermöglich zusätzliche Einsichten, wenn Steuersysteme auf ihre Wachstumsfreundlichkeit und Effizienz untersucht werden sollen Der Bericht untersucht die allgemeinen Charakteristika, die Systematik und die relativen Stärken und Schwächen ertragsabhängiger und ertragsunabhängiger Besteuerung, sowohl mit Blick auf das gesamte Steuersystem als auch hinsichtlich der Einzelsteuern. Vor dem Hintergrund der steuerpolitischen Diskussion in Deutschland stehen dabei Erbschaftsteuer und Körperschaftsteuer im Mittelpunkt. Für die KSt modifizieren wir den üblichen Devereux/ Griffith-Ansatz effektiver Steuerbelastung so, dass einkommensunabhängige Elemente innerhalb von EA-Steuern analysiert werden können. Wir simulieren die Zunahme von EUA-Elementen auf zwei Wegen; über einen graduellen Ausbau der Hinzurechnung von Zinsen und über eine graduelle Verschlechterung der Abschreibungsmöglichkeiten. Wir zeigen, dass die Stärkung einkommensunabhängiger Elemente in der Unternehmensbesteuerung asymmetrische Wirkungen für verschiedene Investitionen hat. The report discusses the relationship of incomedependent taxation (IDT) and incomeindependent taxation (IIT) in Germany and in the OECD. Usually, the combination of direct and indirect taxes is viewed as a dominant characteristic of a country's tax system. Instead, we focus on the question of how far taxation depends on productive activities, i.e. the generation of income and profits, and which role taxes related to other, income-independent sources play. The IDT-IITperspective promises additional insight when analysing tax competition issues, when studying the growth-enhancing properties and the efficiency of a tax system. We analyse the general features, the systematic taxonomy, as well as strong and weak points of IDT and IIT for entire tax systems and for single taxes. Following contemporary German tax debates, the analysis of single taxes centres upon inheritance tax and corporate income tax. For the latter, we modify the standard Devereux/ Griffith-approach to effective tax burdens so that income-independent elements in IDTcorporate taxes can be analysed. On this basis, we simulate the gradual increase of IIT-elements within corporate income tax through two channels, by limiting deductions of interest expenses and by limiting deductions for depreciation. We show that the shift from IDT-taxation to a composite system with stronger IIT-elements has asymmetric effects for different investments.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/221887
    Series: FiFo-Berichte ; Nr. 10 (Juli 2008)
    Subjects: Ertragsabhängige Steuern; ertragsunabhängige Steuern; Steuersystem; Steuerwettbewerb; Income-dependent taxes; income-independent taxes; tax system; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 154 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners
    Published: September 2020
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are... more

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    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. In this setting we show that overconfidence (i) unambiguously increases the bonus component in the managers' compensation package and (ii) it reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium. Hence overconfidence can contribute to explaining both the increasing role of bonus contracts and the fall in marginal tax rates for high-income earners.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
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    hdl: 10419/226252
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8550 (2020)
    Subjects: overconfidence; bonus taxes; tax competition; migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen