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Displaying results 1 to 9 of 9.

  1. Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Nishimura, Yukihiro
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are... more

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    We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high state and hence of receiving the bonus, whereas firms and governments are not. When governments maximize tax revenues, we show that overconfidence unambiguously reduces the bonus tax rate that governments set in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium, while increasing tax revenues. When the government objective incorporates the welfare of resident managers, however, bonus taxes also serve a corrective role and may rise in equilibrium when overconfidence is increased.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256785
    Edition: Revised version, February 2022
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 318 (February 14, 2022)
    Subjects: Overconfidence; bonus taxes; tax competition; migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Taxing mobile and overconfident top earners
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Nishimura, Yukihiro
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11094/86379
    Edition: Revised version, February 2022
    Series: Discussion papers in economics and business ; 21, 26
    Subjects: Overconfidence; bonus taxes; tax competition; migration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Property tax competition
    Author: Borck, Rainald; Oshiro, Jun; Satō, Yasuhiro
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 52 (October 2022)
    Subjects: efficiency; property taxes; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (71 Seiten, 11002 KB), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxa-tion regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes
  4. Property tax competition
    a quantitative assessment
    Author: Borck, Rainald; Oshiro, Jun; Satō, Yasuhiro
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and "rent seeking" regimes. We show that... more

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    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and "rent seeking" regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267235
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 10002 (2022)
    Subjects: property taxes; tax competition; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less
    Author: Janeba, Eckhard; Schjelderup, Guttorm
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue... more

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    The OECD’s proposal for a global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% aims for a reversal of a decades-long race to the bottom of corporate tax rates driven by competition over real investments and profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on the induced strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect of the GMT is a reduction in profit shifting, which has a positive effect on revenues in high-tax countries as their tax base grows, and makes higher taxes attractive. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting real foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We argue that the revenue effects of the GMT depend on the instruments governments use to attract firms. With endogenous corporate tax rates, revenues in non-havens increase if initially tax competition among non-havens is fierce. By contrast, when governments compete via lump sum subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252140
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9623 (2022)
    Subjects: global minimum tax; tax competition; OECD BEPS; Pillar II
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  6. Pareto-improving minimum corporate taxation
    Author: Hebous, Shafik; Keen, Michael
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The recent international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the... more

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    The recent international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the strategic responses to a minimum tax, which the policy objective being to change the rules of tax competition game are critical for assessing the design and welfare impact of, and prospects for, this fundamental policy innovation. Analysis and calibration plausibly suggest sizable scope for minima that are Pareto-improving, benefiting low tax countries as well as high tax, relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252150
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9633 (2022)
    Subjects: tax competition; minimum taxation; corporate tax reform; international taxation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Property tax competition
    a quantitative assessment
    Author: Borck, Rainald; Oshiro, Jun; Satō, Yasuhiro
    Published: Sptember 2022
    Publisher:  [CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo], [Tokyo]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; CIRJE-F-1199
    Subjects: property taxes; tax competition; efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Attracting profit shifting or fostering innovation?
    on patent boxes and RD subsidies
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Schindler, Dirk
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes... more

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    Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies non-cooperatively, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy, whereas the patent box tax rate is targeted at attracting international profit shifting. In equilibrium, patent box regimes emerge endogenously under policy competition, but never under policy coordination. We also compare the competition for mobile patents with the competition for mobile R&D units and show that enforcing a nexus principle is likely to reduce the aggressiveness of patent box regimes.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282028
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 336 (September 9, 2022)
    Subjects: corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten)
  9. Property tax competition
    Author: Borck, Rainald; Oshiro, Jun; Satō, Yasuhiro
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

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    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 52 (October 2022)
    Subjects: efficiency; property taxes; tax competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (71 Seiten, 11002 KB), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxa-tion regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. We quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to the three regimes for Japan and Germany. The decentralized or rent-seeking regime best describes the Japanese tax system, whereas the centralized regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of regime changes