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Displaying results 1 to 10 of 10.

  1. Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Mardan, Mohammed
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Univ., Volkswirtschaftl. Fak., München

    Following recent court rulings, cross-border loss compensation for multinational firms will likely be introduced, at least in Europe. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in a setting where... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 483 (2013,2)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Following recent court rulings, cross-border loss compensation for multinational firms will likely be introduced, at least in Europe. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in a setting where multinational firms choose the size of a risky investment and host countries endogenously choose tax rates. We show that coordinated cross-border loss compensation is likely to intensify tax competition when, following current international practice, the parent firm's home country bases the tax rebate for a loss-making subsidiary on its own tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenue losses will then be even higher than is implied by the direct effect of the reform. In contrast, tax competition will be mitigated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in the subsidiary's host country.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/104403
    Series: Munich discussion paper ; 2013-2
    Subjects: cross-border loss relief; tax competition; profit shifting
    Scope: Online-Ressource (33 S.)
  2. Tax competition, investment irreversibility and the provision of public goods
    Author: Moretto, Michele; Panteghini, Paolo; Vergalli, Sergio
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source-based taxation, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn, in the short term. The converse is true during a recovery, when they are underprovided. In the long term however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation and therefore, the provision of public goods.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/77669
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4256
    Subjects: irreversibility; risk; short- and long-term effects; tax competition
    Scope: Online-Ressource (17 S.)
  3. The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition
    Author: Haupt, Alexander; Krieger, Tim
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Freiburg

    In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing 'relocation' mobility of firms leads to increasing 'net' tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation... more

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    In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing 'relocation' mobility of firms leads to increasing 'net' tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensi.es tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. The resulting fall in the governments' subsidy payments overcompensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues. We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74526
    Series: Diskussionsbeiträge / Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur ; 2013-02
    Subjects: tax competition; subsidy competition; capital and firm mobility; foreign direct investment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (37 S.)
  4. Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments
    conference paper
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Federal states in Germany are characterized by low fiscal autonomy. Equalization systems in place balance revenue differences to a considerable extent and states cannot independently set taxes of any major relevance. Although these features of German... more

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    Federal states in Germany are characterized by low fiscal autonomy. Equalization systems in place balance revenue differences to a considerable extent and states cannot independently set taxes of any major relevance. Although these features of German federalism are notorious for their disincentives none of the recent reform initiatives of German federalism have been able to change the system. This study makes use of a unique survey among the members of all 16 state parliaments to explain the formation of autonomy preferences. It tests to which extent the preferences of state policy makers for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results point, inter alia, to the role of state deficit and the structural differences between states. States with high permanent deficits are more opposed to tax autonomy and more in favour of higher fiscal equalization transfers.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79736
    Series: Array ; V2
    Subjects: fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  5. Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZEW, Mannheim

    Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 15 (2013,90)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states’ self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/88117
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; No. 13-090
    Subjects: fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism
    Scope: Online-Ressource (43 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
    Author: Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this paper analyses the conditions under which tax coordination by a group of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is increasing in the total number of countries.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89664
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4454
    Subjects: tax coordination; tax competition; coalition; self-enforcing
    Scope: Online-Ressource (28 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
    Author: Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger
    Published: Feb. 2013
    Publisher:  Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, Siegen

    Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the wel- fare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 46 (160)
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    Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the wel- fare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this paper analyses the con- ditions under which tax coordination by a group of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable coalition is not very effec- tive in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is increasing in the total number of countries.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/98425
    Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge / Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht ; 160
    Subjects: tax coordination; tax competition; coalition; self-enforcing
    Scope: Online-Ressource (28 S.), graph. Darst.
  8. Intellectual property box regimes
    effective tax rates and tax policy considerations
    Author: Evers, Lisa; Miller, Helen; Spengel, Christoph
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZEW, Mannheim

    11 European countries now operate IP Box regimes that provide substantially reduced rates of corporate tax for income derived from important forms of intellectual property. We incorporate these policies into forward-looking measures of the cost of... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 15 (2013,70)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    11 European countries now operate IP Box regimes that provide substantially reduced rates of corporate tax for income derived from important forms of intellectual property. We incorporate these policies into forward-looking measures of the cost of capital, effective marginal tax rates and effective average tax rates. We show that the treatment of expenses relating to IP income is particularly important in determining the effective tax burden. A key finding is that regimes that allow expenses to be deducted at the ordinary corporate income tax rate, as opposed to the IP Box tax rate, may result in negative tax rates and can thereby provide a subsidy to unprofitable projects. We assess the specific design features of different regimes against the possible policy aim of improving the incentives to undertake R&D investment in a country. While some countries have tried to tie the policy to real activities, others have designed a policy targeted at the income streams associated with intellectual property. A key concern is the role that IP Boxes may play in increased, and possibly harmful, tax competition between European countries.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/83475
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; No. 13-070
    Subjects: corporate taxation; effective tax rate; innovation; tax incentive patent box; innovation box; license box; tax competition
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  9. The natural resource curse, fiscal decentralization, and agglomeration economies
    Author: Perez-Sebastian, Fidel; Raveh, Ohad
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, Oxford

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Format: Online
    Series: Research papers / Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies ; 112
    Subjects: Natural resources; economic growth; fiscal decentralization; agglomeration economies; tax competition
    Scope: Online-Ressource (47 S.), graph. Darst.
  10. Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?
    Author: Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice; Zou, Benteng
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Center for Mathematical Economics, IMW, Bielefeld

    Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition.The aim of this... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition.The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity if we consider that countries compete not only in taxes but also in the provision of infrastructure. The simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/81118
    Series: Working papers / Center for Mathematical Economics ; 486
    Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper ; No. 486
    Subjects: tax competition; social welfare; inefficiency; infrastructure
    Scope: Online-Ressource (9 S.)