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  1. Optimal destabilization of cartels
    Author: Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham
    Published: February 2, 2020
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    A model-based derivation of an effective antitrust policy requires an economic framework that includes three actors: a cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel behavior, at least one of these actors is always missing. By contrast, the present paper's oligopoly model includes all three actors. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. Taking into account that the antitrust policy instruments (effort, fine, and leniency program) are not costless for society, an optimal policy is derived.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224521
    Series: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 48
    Subjects: antitrust; stability; Cournot fringe; oligopoly; leniency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten)
  2. Imperfect collusion on surveilled markets with free entry
    Author: Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Universität Trier, Trier

    Surveys of cartel proceedings reveal that illegal cartels usually (1) attempt to minimize the risk of detection, (2) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some fringe firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and exits. By... more

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    Surveys of cartel proceedings reveal that illegal cartels usually (1) attempt to minimize the risk of detection, (2) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some fringe firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and exits. By contrast, existing oligopoly models of collusive behavior consider only some of the four listed stylized facts and, thus, run the risk of missing important interdependencies between them. Therefore, the present paper develops a general quantity leadership model that simultaneously accommodates all four stylized facts. Within this model, an imperfectly colluding group of firms competes against independent fringe rivals. The market is surveilled by an antitrust authority that has three different policy instruments at its disposal: Ensuring free market access, obstructing collusion, and discouraging collusion through law enforcement. The results of the model indicate that the latter two instruments are rather ineffective.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/274123
    Series: Research papers in economics ; no. 23, 5
    Subjects: antitrust; fringe; oligopoly; stability; sustainability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Optimal destabilization of cartels
    Author: Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Universität Trier, Trier

    The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an augmented... more

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    Signature:
    DS 434
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    The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The antitrust authority decides on its own investigative effort and on the size of the fine that cartel members have to pay when they are detected. For testifying cartel members a leniency program is implemented. Our framework takes into account that these antitrust policy instruments are not costless for society. Our model demonstrates that the optimal antitrust policy exploits the inherent instability of a cartel to reduce its size.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/207039
    Series: Research papers in economics ; no. 19, 7
    Subjects: antitrust; stability; Cournot fringe; oligopoly; leniency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen