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  1. Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior
    an experiment
    Author: Possajennikov, Alexandre
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Nottingham

    Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 175 (2012,6)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of the initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about strategies are updated faster than beliefs about types. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/100143
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; 2012-06
    Subjects: beliefs; signalling; experiment; learning; belief elicitation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 29 S., 913,17 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Credit sales and advance payments: substitutes or complements?
    Author: Mateut, Simona; Zanchettin, Piercarlo
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. of Leicester, Dep. of Economics, Leicester

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Leicester, Department of Economics ; 12/18
    Subjects: trade credit; advance payment; signalling
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 98KB), graph. Darst.