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Displaying results 1 to 21 of 21.

  1. Whoever you want me to be: personality and incentives
    Author: McGee, Andrew D.; McGee, Peter
    Published: October 2020
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation.... more

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    What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in most treatments but are correlated with intelligence when test-takers have information about desired personalities or are warned that responses may be verified. We document that actual job ads provide information about desired personalities and that employers in the UK who administer personality tests are also likely to administer intelligence tests despite the potential for substitution between the tests.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227336
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13809
    Subjects: personality; measurement; hiring; screening; experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 84 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Patent screening, innovation, and welfare
    Author: Schankerman, Mark; Schütt, Florian
    Published: 17 September 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP15301
    Subjects: innovation; patent quality; screening; litigation; courts; patent fees; licensing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Sorting in credit rationing
    an elementary survey
    Author: Camacho, Carmen; Cho, Hye-Jin
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Paris School of Economics, Paris

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    Series: Working paper / Paris School of Economics ; no 2020, 77
    Subjects: single crossing property; screening; credit rationing; performance incentives
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten)
  4. Support for small businesses amid COVID-19
    Author: Goodhart, Charles A. E.; Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.; Wang, Xuan
    Published: 17 July 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP15055
    Subjects: COVID-19; government guarantees; optimal default sanction; unemployment; productivity; adverse selection; private information; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Designing disability insurance reforms
    tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?
    Author: Haller, Andreas; Staubli, Stefan; Zweimüller, Josef
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  Retirement and Savings Institute, [Montréal]

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    Series: Working paper / Institut sur la retraite et l'épargne, HEC Montréal ; no. 5
    Subjects: Disability insurance; screening; benefits; policy reform
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Screening and loan origination time
    lending standards, loan defaults and bank failures
    Author: Bedayo, Mikel; Jiménez, Gabriel; Peydró, José-Luis; Vegas, Raquel
    Published: October 2020
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Series: Economics working paper ; no. 1749
    Subjects: Loan origination time; lending standards; credit cycles; defaults; bank failures; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Honesty in the digital age
    Author: Cohn, Alain; Gesche, Tobias; Maréchal, Michel André
    Published: December 2020
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Modern communication technologies enable effcient exchange of information but often sacrifice direct human interaction inherent in more traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether the lack of personal interaction induces... more

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    Modern communication technologies enable effcient exchange of information but often sacrifice direct human interaction inherent in more traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether the lack of personal interaction induces individuals to exploit informational asymmetries. We conducted two experiments with a total of 848 subjects to examine how human versus machine interaction influences cheating for financial gain. We find that individuals cheat about three times more when they interact with a machine rather than a person, regardless of whether the machine is equipped with human features. When interacting with a human, individuals are particularly reluctant to report unlikely and, therefore, suspicious outcomes, which is consistent with social image concerns. The second experiment shows that dishonest individuals prefer to interact with a machine when facing an opportunity to cheat. Our results suggest that human presence is key to mitigating dishonest behavior and that self-selection into communication channels can be used to screen for dishonest people.

     
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    hdl: 10419/228882
    Edition: Revised version
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 280
    Subjects: Honesty; cheating; human interaction; digitization; social image; screening; Ehrlichkeit; Asymmetrische Information; Betrug; Digitalisierung; Interaktion; Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Prudence and prevention
    empirical evidence
    Author: Mayrhofer, Thomas; Schmitz, Hendrik
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen, Germany

    Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order... more

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    Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung. Theoretische Arbeiten zeigen, dass optimale Präventionsentscheidungen im Sinne des Selbstschutzes (d.h. primäre Prävention) nicht nur vom Grad der Risikoaversion (zweiter Ordnung) abhängen, sondern auch von Risikopräferenzen höherer Ordnung, wie zum Beispiel Vorsicht (prudence, Risikoaversion dritter Ordnung). Wir untersuchen empirisch, ob diese theoretischen Ergebnisse halten und ob vorsichtige (prudent) Personen weniger Prävention betreiben als nicht vorsichtige Personen. Wir verwenden dazu einen Datensatz, der Risikopräferenzen höherer Ordnung und tatsächliches Präventionsverhalten enthält. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass vorsichtige Personen tatsächlich weniger in Vorsorge - gemessen über die jährliche Grippeimpfung - investieren. Dieses Ergebnis wird durch Personen der Risikogruppe getrieben, die also älter als 60 Jahre oder chronisch krank sind. Wir finden keinen eindeutigen empirischen Zusammenhang zwischen Risikopräferenzen und Prävention im Sinne der Selbstversicherung (d.h. Sekundärprävention). Weder Risikoaversion noch Vorsicht (prudence) steht im Zusammenhang mit Krebsvorsorgeuntersuchungen wie Mammographien, Pap-Abstrichen oder Röntgenaufnahmen der Lunge.

     
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    ISBN: 9783969730003
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224092
    Series: Ruhr economic papers ; #863
    Subjects: Prudence; risk preferences; prevention; vaccination; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Patent, screening, innovation and welfare
    Author: Schankerman, Mark; Schütt, Florian
    Published: September 2020
    Publisher:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

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    Series: Discussion paper / CentER, Center for Economic Research ; no. 2020, 024
    TILEC discussion papers ; no. 2020, 024
    Subjects: innovation; patent quality; screening; litigation; courts; patent fees; licensing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten)
  10. Screening and loan origination time
    lending standards, loan defaults and bank failures
    Author: Bedayo, Mikel; Jiménez, Gabriel; Peydró, José-Luis; Vegas, Raquel
    Published: November 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1215
    Subjects: loan origination time; lending standards; credit cycles; defaults; bank failures; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Prudence and prevention
    empirical evidence
    Author: Mayrhofer, Thomas; Schmitz, Hendrik
    Published: August 2020
    Publisher:  Universität Paderborn, Center for International Economics, [Paderborn]

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    Series: Center for International Economics working paper series ; no. 2020, 06
    Subjects: Marginal treatment effect; prudence; risk preferences; prevention; vaccination; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Selling dreams
    endogenous optimism in lending markets
    Author: Bridet, Luc; Schwardmann, Peter
    Published: May 2020
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material... more

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    We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being optimistic in equilibrium. Our model thus helps explain why wishful thinking is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.

     
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    hdl: 10419/217022
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8271 (2020)
    Subjects: optimal expectations; motivated cognition; wishful thinking; financial crisis; lending markets; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Kuncl, Martin
    Published: 01 March 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Series: Array ; DP14458
    Subjects: Loan insurance; Adverse Selection; screening; market liquidity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Kuncl, Martin
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Series: SRC discussion paper ; no 94 (March 2020)
    Subjects: Loan insurance; adverse selection; screening; market liquidity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Selling dreams
    endogenous optimism in lending markets
    Author: Bridet, Luc; Schwardmann, Peter
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material... more

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    We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being optimistic in equilibrium. Our model thus helps explain why wishful thinking is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222135
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 238 (April 28, 2020)
    Subjects: optimal expectations; motivated cognition; wishful thinking; financial crisis; lending markets; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?
    Author: Haller, Andreas; Staubli, Stefan; Zweimüller, Josef
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate fiscal... more

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    We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate fiscal multipliers (total over mechanical cost reductions) of 2.0-2.5 for stricter DI eligibility rules and of 1.3-1.4 for lower DI benefits. Stricter DI eligibility rules generate lower income losses (earnings + transfers), particularly at the lower end of the income distribution. Hence, to roll back the Austrian DI program, policy makers should implement tighter DI eligibility rules rather than lower DI benefits. An application of our framework to the DI system of the U.S. suggests that DI eligibility rules are too strict and DI benefits are too low.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/223981
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13539
    Subjects: disability insurance; screening; benefits; policy reform
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent
    Author: Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by... more

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    We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that rankings can reduce welfare distortions of optimal screening contracts if the degree of competition for talent is sufficiently low. In contrast, a ranking unambiguously reduces welfare if the competition intensity is high and agents suffer from lagging behind while it can enhance welfare (depending on the fraction of high and low productivity types) if agents suffer from leading in a ranking (e.g., because the ranked activity is perceived as a substitute for other potentially pro-social activities).

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238243
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 19
    Subjects: Incentive compensation; screening; imperfect labor market competition; socialcomparison; rankings
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  18. Differentiation and risk aversion in imperfectly competitive labor markets
    Author: Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; Walzl, Markus
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized... more

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    This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized by vertical, respectively horizontal, differentiation - compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. The degree of competition then determines the structure of these contracts. Three regions can be distinguished: For low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too little effort. For high competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range of intermediate degrees of competition, however, agents' private information has no impact and contracts are second-best. An equilibrium where both firms are active exists only when the least-cost separating allocation (LCS) is interim efficient. If firms are only vertically differentiated, then the inferior firm is inactive in equilibrium, but its competitive threat still generates the three regions just described. Moreover, an equilibrium in which the inferior firm would not break even when attracting both agent types may exist even when the LCS is not interim efficient. We show that the degrees of vertical and horizontal differentiation have opposite impacts on the condition for interim efficiency of the LCS.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238239
    Series: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 15
    Subjects: Incentive compensation; screening; imperfect labor market competition; vertical differentiation; horizontal differentiation; risk aversion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Designing disability insurance reforms
    tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?
    Author: Haller, Andreas; Staubli, Stefan; Zweimüller, Josef
    Published: 01 August 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP15121
    Subjects: Disability insurance; screening; benefits; Policy Reform
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards
    Author: Ahnert, Toni; Kuncl, Martin
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  [LSE Financial Markets Group], [London]

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    Series: [FMG discussion paper] ; [DP 794]
    SRC discussion paper ; no 94 (March 2020)
    Subjects: Loan insurance; adverse selection; screening; market liquidity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. LOCKED OUT: Where are the Ethnic Minority Women?
    Shortcomings of Cervical Cancer Screening Programs in Developed Countries
    Author: Akellot, Daniella
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken

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    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9786202525756; 6202525754
    Other identifier:
    9786202525756
    Edition: 1. Auflage
    Other subjects: (Produktform)Electronic book text; Cervical cancer; screening; Immigrants; ethnic minorities; migrants; Women; developed countries; high income countries; low uptake; barriers; poor attendance; Factors; inhibitors; (VLB-WN)1726: Soziologie/Frauenforschung, Geschlechterforschung
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 60 Seiten
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    Vom Verlag als Druckwerk on demand und/oder als E-Book angeboten