Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 10 of 10.

  1. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191 (304)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/192913
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 304
    Subjects: Trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Attitudes and Perceptions of Nurses and Doctors on IPV Screening
    Attitudes and Perceptions of Nurses and Medical Doctors on Introducing Intimate Partner Violence Screening
    Author: Mukulu, Martin Ndakalako
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9786139880096; 6139880092
    Other identifier:
    9786139880096
    Edition: 1. Auflage
    Other subjects: (Produktform)Electronic book text; intimate partner violence; Domestic Violence; Gender-based violence; screening; Attitude; Perception; HIV/AIDS; rape; Sexually Transmitted Disease; cultural beliefs; (VLB-WN)1726: Soziologie/Frauenforschung, Geschlechterforschung
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 84 Seiten
    Notes:

    Lizenzpflichtig. - Vom Verlag als Druckwerk on demand und/oder als E-Book angeboten
  3. Why is math cheaper than English?
    understanding cost differences in higher education
    Author: Hemelt, Steven W.; Stange, Kevin M.; Furquim, Fernando; Simon, Andrew; Sawyer, John E.
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (25314)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 25314
    Subjects: Hochschule; Studium; Wissenschaft; Studienfinanzierung; Signalling; Matching; USA; Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; costly preference formation; screening; stable matching; congestion; matching market place
    Scope: 55 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  4. Can the private sector ensure the public interest?
    evidence from federal procurement
    Author: Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, Mannheim

    We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 15 (2018,45)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance companies whose money is at stake through the so-called performance bonding. By focusing on the U.S. federal service contracts in the period 2005-2015, we exploit an exogenous variation in the threshold for the application of both sources of oversight in order to separately estimate their causal e effects on execution costs and time. We find that: (i) private oversight has a positive effect on outcomes through the screening of bidders that alters the pool of winning firms; (ii) public oversight negatively affects outcomes, due to excessive red tape induced by low-competence buyers.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/183567
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung ; no. 18, 045
    Subjects: oversight; procurement; screening; red tape; moral hazard
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 79 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (11917)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193211
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11917
    Subjects: trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7324)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185522
    Series: Array ; no. 7324
    Subjects: trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Gender-targeted job ads in the recruitment process
    evidence from China
    Author: Kuhn, Peter Joseph; Shen, Kailing; Zhang, Shuo
    Published: December 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    We document how explicit employer requests for applicants of a particular gender enter the recruitment process on a Chinese job board. We find that 95 percent of callbacks to gendered jobs are of the requested gender; worker self-selection... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We document how explicit employer requests for applicants of a particular gender enter the recruitment process on a Chinese job board. We find that 95 percent of callbacks to gendered jobs are of the requested gender; worker self-selection ("compliance" with employers' requests) and employer callback decisions from applicant pools ("enforcement") both contribute to this association, with compliance playing the larger role. Explicit gender requests account for over half of the gender segregation and gender wage gap observed on the board. Ad-level regressions with job title and firm fixed effects suggest that employers' explicit gender requests have causal effects on the gender mix of applications received, especially when the employer's likely gender preference is hard to infer from other contents of the ad. Application-level regressions with job title and worker fixed effects show that both men and women experience a callback penalty when applying to a gender-mismatched job; this penalty is significantly greater for women (44 percent) than men (26 percent).

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193316
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12022
    Subjects: gender; discrimination; China; internet search; recruiting; screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 103 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. A Pigouvian approach to congestion in matching markets
    Author: He, Yinghua; Magnac, Thierry
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (11967)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can be used as a Pigouvian tax. Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193261
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11967
    Subjects: Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; costly preference formation; screening; stable matching; congestion; matching market place
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 81 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Why is math cheaper than English?
    understanding cost differences in higher education
    Author: Hemelt, Steven W.; Stange, Kevin M.; Furquim, Fernando; Simon, Andrew; Sawyer, John E.
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (11968)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can be used as a Pigouvian tax. Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193262
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11968
    Subjects: Hochschule; Studium; Wissenschaft; Studienfinanzierung; Signalling; Matching; Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; costly preference formation; screening; stable matching; congestion; matching market place
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 78 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Measuring the signaling value of educational degrees
    secondary education systems and the internal homogeneity of educational groups
    Author: Heisig, Jan Paul
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    [BACKGROUND:] By providing high-quality, internationally comparable data on the cognitive skills of working-age adults, the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) offers great potential for illuminating the complex... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    [BACKGROUND:] By providing high-quality, internationally comparable data on the cognitive skills of working-age adults, the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) offers great potential for illuminating the complex interplay of formal qualifications and skills in shaping labor market attainment as well as social inequalities more broadly. I argue that PIAAC can be used to construct direct, country-level measures of the "skill transparency" or "signaling value" of formal qualifications, that is, of how informative the latter are about a person's actual skills. The primary goal of the analysis is to extend previous work on skills gaps by educational attainment and map cross-national variation in the internal skills homogeneity of educational groups as a second dimension shaping the signaling value of educational degrees. I also explore whether the internal homogeneity of educational groups is related to national (secondary) education systems. [METHODS:] I use a sample of 30,646 20-to-34-year-olds in 21 countries that participated in the first round of PIAAC. The internal homogeneity of educational groups is measured using the residual standard deviation of literacy and numeracy skills after adjusting for sex, age, and foreign-birth/foreign-language status. Residual standard deviations for the different educational groups are subjected to a factor analysis to construct a one-dimensional measure of internal homogeneity for each country. This index of internal homogeneity is then related to education system characteristics in a series of country-level regressions. [RESULTS:] The internal homogeneity of educational groups with respect to literacy and numeracy skills varies considerably across countries and is highly correlated across both skill domains and educational groups. Educational groups tend to be more homogeneous in countries with stronger (ability-related) tracking in secondary education. In addition, there is some evidence that internal homogeneity declines when instructional resources such as computer hardware and lab equipment are distributed more unequally across schools. An unexpected finding is that internal homogeneity is negatively associated with standardization of input (e.g., curricula, textbooks). [CONCLUSIONS:] The signaling value of educational degrees varies substantially across advanced economies, not only in terms of skills gaps among educational groups, but also in terms of their internal homogeneity. Some features of secondary education systems appear to be systematically related to the extent of internal homogeneity. The findings lend empirical support to so far untested assumptions about the relationship between formal qualifications and skills in cross-national research on labor market inequalities.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/182012
    Parent title: Sonderdruck aus: Large-scale assessments in education; (2018) 6:9, pp. 1-35
    Subjects: PIAAC; education systems; educational credentials; labor market attainment; signaling; screening; human capital theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen