Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Let the market decide
    an experimental study of competition and fairness
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Zurich

    Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191 (158)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find that the same unfavorable terms of trade trigger significantly less punishment if the buyer uses a competitive auction to determine the terms of trade than if she uses her authority to dictate the same terms directly. Our results inform the debate on the fairness of market outcomes by showing that the use of a competitive procedure can, by itself, affect how people judge unequal distributive outcomes.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111210
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; 158
    Subjects: Competition; authority; markets; fairness; responsibility; procedures
    Scope: Online-Ressource (49 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Contributing to public goods as individuals versus group representatives
    evidence of gender differences
    Author: Hauge, Karen Evelyn; Røgeberg, Ole
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo, Oslo

    We report evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing contributions in public good games played as individuals to contributions made as group representatives. We find that women alter their behaviour more than men. The change is in an out-group... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 140 (2014,16)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We report evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing contributions in public good games played as individuals to contributions made as group representatives. We find that women alter their behaviour more than men. The change is in an out-group friendly direction: while men's contributions are largely similar across the two treatments, women increase their contributions by 40% on average as group representatives. The results are consistent with empirical research from labour markets suggesting that female corporate leaders emphasize stakeholders beyond the shareholders to a larger extent than men, and they are in line with stereotypes commonly held regarding male and female leaders.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102062
    Edition: This version July 2014
    Series: Memorandum / Department of Economics, University of Oslo ; 16/2014
    Subjects: responsibility; group representative; gender; public good game; laboratory experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (17 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Luck, choice and responsibility
    an experimental study of fairness views
    Author: Möllerström, Johanna; Reme, Bjørn-Atle; Sørensen, Erik Ø.
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Research Inst. of Industrial Economics, Stockholm

    We conduct a laboratory experiment where third-party spectators can redistribute resources between two agents, thereby offsetting the consequences of controllable and uncontrollable luck. Some spectators go to the limits and equalize all or no... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 206 (1014)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We conduct a laboratory experiment where third-party spectators can redistribute resources between two agents, thereby offsetting the consequences of controllable and uncontrollable luck. Some spectators go to the limits and equalize all or no inequalities, but many follow an interior allocation rule previously unaccounted for by the fairness views in the literature. These interior allocators regard an agent's choice as more important than the cause of her low income and do not always compensate bad uncontrollable luck. Instead, they condition such compensation on the agent's decision regarding controllable luck exposure, even though the two types of luck are independent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/109110
    Series: IFN working paper ; 1014
    Subjects: Gerechtigkeit; Verantwortung; Umverteilung; Experiment; USA; fairness; responsibility; option luck; brute luck; experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Let the market decide
    an experimental study of competition and fairness
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (4831)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find that the same unfavorable terms of trade trigger significantly less punishment if the buyer uses a competitive auction to determine the terms of trade than if she uses her authority to dictate the same terms directly. Our results inform the debate on the fairness of market outcomes by showing that the use of a competitive procedure can, by itself, affect how people judge unequal distributive outcomes.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102107
    Series: Array ; 4831
    Subjects: competition; authority; markets; fairness; responsibility; procedures
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 49 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.