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Displaying results 1 to 12 of 12.

  1. Normative perception of power abuse
    Author: Hoeft, Leonard; Mill, Wladislaw; Vostroknutov, Alexander
    Published: March 2019
    Publisher:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one... more

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    We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one player (punisher) is given a further ability to costlessly subtract money from others (victims). Punishers who abuse their power rationalize their behavior by believing that free-riding, while forcing others to contribute, is not inappropriate. More importantly, victims of such abuse also start to believe that punishers' free-riding and punishment are justifiable. Our findings demonstrate the capacity of humans to exculpate abusive behavior.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/204704
    Series: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2019, 6
    Subjects: power abuse; norms; public goods; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Cooperation in a fragmented society
    experimental evidence on syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon
    Author: Drouvelis, Michalis; Malaeb, Bilal; Vlassopoulos, Michael; Wahba, Jackline
    Published: December 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group... more

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    Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that homogeneous groups, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than mixed groups. These patterns are driven by the Lebanese participants. Our findings suggest that it is equally important to provide adequate help to the host communities to alleviate any economic and social pressures.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/215254
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12858
    Subjects: refugees; public good game; cooperation; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Stay or flee?
    probability versus severity of punishment in hit-and-run accidents
    Author: Castriota, Stefano; Tonin, Mirco
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes... more

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    The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes and in this paper we focus on a very serious and widespread one, hit-and-run road accidents. In fact, it is not only unplanned, but also largely committed by citizens without criminal records and the decision whether to stay or run must be taken within a few seconds. Using Italian data for the period 1996-2016, we rely on daylight as an exogenous source of variation affecting the probability of apprehension and find that the likelihood of hit-and-run conditional on an accident taking place increases by around 20% with darkness. Relying on two legislative reforms which increased the penalties in case of hit-and-run, we find no significant effect on drivers’ behavior. Our results show that criminal activities in unplanned circumstances and under intense time pressure and emotional distress are deterred more by the certainty rather than the severity of legal sanctions.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/207298
    Series: Array ; no. 7907 (October 2019)
    Subjects: crime; hit-and-run; road; accidents; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Stay or flee?
    probability versus severity of punishment in hit-and-run accidents
    Author: Castriota, Stefano; Tonin, Mirco
    Published: October 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes and in this paper we focus on a very serious and widespread one, hit-and-run road accidents. In fact, it is not only unplanned, but also largely committed by citizens without criminal records and the decision whether to stay or run must be taken within a few seconds. Using Italian data for the period 1996-2016, we rely on daylight as an exogenous source of variation affecting the probability of apprehension and find that the likelihood of hit-and-run conditional on an accident taking place increases by around 20% with darkness. Relying on two legislative reforms which increased the penalties in case of hit-and-run, we find no significant effect on drivers' behavior. Our results show that criminal activities in unplanned circumstances and under intense time pressure and emotional distress are deterred more by the certainty rather than the severity of legal sanctions.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/207517
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12693
    Subjects: crime; hit-and-run; road accidents; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Cooperation in a fragmented society: experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon
    Author: Drouvelis, Michalis; Malaeb, Bilal; Vlassopoulos, Michael; Wahba, Jackline
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  [The London School of Economics and Political Science, Institute of Global Affairs], [London]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [LSE IGA working paper series] ; [10 (2019)]
    Subjects: refugees; public good game; cooperation; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Cooperation in a fragmented society
    experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon
    Author: Drouvelis, Michalis; Malaeb, Bilal; Vlassopoulos, Michael; Wahba, Jackline
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-thefield experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-thefield experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that homogeneous groups, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than mixed groups. These patterns are driven by the Lebanese participants. Our findings suggest that it is equally important to provide adequate help to the host communities to alleviate any economic and social pressures.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/215040
    Series: Array ; no. 8038 (December 2019)
    Subjects: refugees; public good game; cooperation; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Civic engagement as a second-order public good
    the cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
    Published: September 2, 2019
    Publisher:  [Brown University, Department of Economics], [Providence, RI]

    Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the... more

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    Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a "leverage effect" because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/227601
    Series: [Working papers] / [Brown University, Department of Economics] ; [2019, 8]
    Subjects: civic engagement; public goods provision; punishment; experiment; cooperation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Economic polarization and antisocial behavior
    an experiment
    Author: Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Nas Özen, Efşan
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics, Bologna, Italy

    Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich... more

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    Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich counterpart with whom they had no previous interaction. We test whether the emergence of such forms of antisocial behavior depends only on the level of inequality, or also on the conditions under which inequality occurs. We compare an environment in which the rich can unilaterally reduce inequality with one where generosity makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the poor. We find that the rich are expected to be more generous in the former scenario than in the latter, but in fact this hope is systematically violated. We also observe that the poor engage in forms of antisocial behavior more often when reducing inequality would be safe for the rich. These results cannot be rationalized by inequality aversion alone, while they are in line with recent models that focus on anger as the result of the frustration of expectations.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/213530
    Series: Quaderni - working paper DSE / Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics ; no 1133
    Subjects: expectations; frustration; inequality aversion; money-burning; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Economic polarization and antisocial behavior
    an experiment
    Author: Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Nas Özen, Efşan
    Published: August 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich... more

    Access:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich counterpart with whom they had no previous interaction. We test whether the emergence of such forms of antisocial behavior depends only on the level of inequality, or also on the conditions under which inequality occurs. We compare an environment in which the rich can unilaterally reduce inequality with one where generosity makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the poor. We find that the rich are expected to be more generous in the former scenario than in the latter, but in fact this hope is systematically violated. We also observe that the poor engage in forms of antisocial behavior more often when reducing inequality would be safe for the rich. These results cannot be rationalized by inequality aversion alone, while they are in line with recent models that focus on anger as the result of the frustration of expectations.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/207379
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12553
    Subjects: expectations; frustration; inequality aversion; money-burning; punishment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Civic engagement as a second-order public good
    the cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state
    Author: Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  CDR, Copenhagen

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 572
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers / Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen ; no. 19, 10
    Subjects: civic engagement; public goods provision; punishment; experiment; cooperation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Understanding the relationship between inequalities and poverty
    mechanisms associated with crime, the legal system and punitive sanctions
    Author: Duque, Magali; McKnight, Abigail
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 494
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CASEpaper ; 215 (July 2019)
    LIPpaper ; 6
    Subjects: poverty; inequality; crime; law; punishment; criminal justice; police
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Subjects in the lab, activists in the field
    public goods and punishment
    Author: Dave, Chetan; Hamre, Sjur; Kephart, Curtis; Reuben, Alicja
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, Edmonton

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2019, 06
    Subjects: Public goods; punishment; non-standard subject pool
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 109 Seiten), Illustrationen