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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Just hire your spouse!
    evidence from a political scandal in Bavaria
    Author: Kauder, Björn; Potrafke, Niklas
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  ifo Inst., Munich

    We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. The family scandal was a hot issue in the German media because of the upcoming state and... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 402 (194)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. The family scandal was a hot issue in the German media because of the upcoming state and federal elections. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and voter turnout. The results do not show that being involved in the scandal influenced the outcome and voter turnout of the 2013 state elections. Voters did not appear to punish the incumbent government because the reigning CSU endorses Bavarian identity and managed to overcome the family scandal, as the CSU already managed to overcome previous scandals.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/108761
    Series: Ifo working papers ; 194
    Subjects: Political scandal; favoritism; nepotism; re-election prospects; voter turnout
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 29 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Just hire your spouse!
    evidence from a political scandal in Bavaria
    Author: Kauder, Björn; Potrafke, Niklas
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (4813)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and voter turnout. The results do not show that being involved in the scandal influenced the outcome and voter turnout of the 2013 state elections. We propose three explanations: (i) the Bavarian state election was a test run for the German federal election; (ii) the state government made a quite good job of clarifying failings; (iii) in June 2013, a very heavy bout of flooding eclipsed the political scandal.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/102208
    Series: Array ; 4813
    Subjects: political scandal; favoritism; nepotism; re-election prospects; voter turnout
    Scope: Online-Ressource (24 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen
  3. Publish or perish?
    incentives and careers in Italian academia
    Author: Checchi, Daniele; De Fraja, Gianni; Verzillo, Stefano
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (8345)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion determine academics' effort. Because of the specific characteristics of Italian universities, where incentives operate only through promotion, and where all appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors, the model fits well Italian academia, and we test it in a newly constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian academics working in universities. We find that individual researchers respond to incentives in the manner predicted by the theoretical model: more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the measurable determinants of promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by exerting more effort; less able researchers do the opposite.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/101898
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 8345
    Subjects: career concerns; applied auction theory; publications; academic job market; nepotism
    Scope: Online-Ressource (40 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. The intergenerational mobility of liberal professions
    nepotism versus abilities
    Author: Aina, Carmen; Nicoletti, Cheti
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  ISER, [Colchester]

    By using university administrative and survey data on Italian graduates, we analyze the transmission of liberal professions from fathers to children. We assess the effect of nepotism and family networking, separately from other transmission channels,... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 169 (2014,39)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    By using university administrative and survey data on Italian graduates, we analyze the transmission of liberal professions from fathers to children. We assess the effect of nepotism and family networking, separately from other transmission channels, on the probability of choosing a degree that gives access to liberal professions, of obtaining a licensing and of starting a liberal profession. The results suggest that the effect of nepotism and networking is irrelevant on the degree choice, modest on the success rate at the licensing exam, but large and significant on the probability to start a liberal profession.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/126461
    Series: ISER Working Paper Series ; 2014-39
    Subjects: Professional licensing; liberal profession; intergenerational mobility; nepotism
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([2], 35, VI S.)