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Displaying results 1 to 8 of 8.

  1. Towards a monitoring framework for securities financing transactions
    Author: Bouveret, Antoine; Jardelot, Julien; Keller, Joachim; Molitor, Philippe; Theal, John; Vital, Mathieu
    Published: [2013]
    Publisher:  ESRB, European Systemic Risk Board, European System of Financial Supervision, [Frankfurt am Main, Germany]

    Supervisory authorities around the world are currently engaged in a policy debate over how to improve the information available on repurchase agreements (repos) and securities lending markets. Repo and securities lending transactions commonly... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 612
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    Supervisory authorities around the world are currently engaged in a policy debate over how to improve the information available on repurchase agreements (repos) and securities lending markets. Repo and securities lending transactions commonly referred to as securities financing transactions (SFTs), play a major role in the financial system. Although these can be relatively low-risk transactions by themselves, their pervasive use may give rise to systemic risk, as was observed during the recent financial crisis. In order to establish and implement a monitoring framework that allows for an effective assessment of the financial stability risks associated with SFTs, a number of considerable hurdles must be overcome and important decisions must be made. One contribution of this paper is to identify the potential obstacles and difficulties that may hinder the implementation of a monitoring framework in Europe.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193597
    Series: Occasional paper series / European Systemic Risk Board ; no. 2 (March 2013)
    Subjects: securities lending; monitoring; securities financing transactions; systemic risk
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten)
  2. The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
    Author: Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  LSE Financial Markets Group, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / LSE Financial Markets Group ; 725
    Subjects: CEO compensation; CEO retention; corporate governance; monitoring; ownership structure
    Scope: Online-Ressource (38 S.)
  3. Sanctions for young welfare recipients
    Author: Berg, Gerard J. van den; Uhlendorff, Arne; Wolff, Joachim
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4 (7630)
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    Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the literature on the effects of sanctions in social welfare systems and we present first results on the effects of sanctions for young unemployed welfare recipients based on German administrative data. The German welfare system is particularly strict for young individuals. We distinguish between mild and strong sanctions and we focus on the impact of these sanctions on job finding probabilities. Our results suggest that each type of sanction leads to an increased transition rate to work, and that this effect is higher for strong sanctions. However, strong sanctions for young welfare recipients involve a complete withdrawal of the basic cash transfer payments, and there exists evidence that these severe sanctions might go along with additional, negative effects for sanctioned individuals.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/90056
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 7630
    Subjects: monitoring; welfare; youth unemployment; duration models; unemployment benefits; social assistance
    Scope: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. The consequences of a piece rate on quantity and quality
    evidence from a field experiment
    Author: Heywood, John S.; Siebert, William S.; Wei, Xiangdong
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4 (7660)
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    This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. "Committed" workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89992
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 7660
    Subjects: piece rate; monitoring; shirking; quantity and quality trade off; field experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (33 S.), graph. Darst.
  5. Sanctions for young welfare recipients
    Author: Berg, Gerard J. van den; Uhlendorff, Arne; Wolff, Joachim
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Inst. for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy, Uppsala

    Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 137 (2013,26)
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    Social welfare systems usually imply specific obligations for benefit recipients. If a recipient does not comply with these obligations, a sanction involving a punitive benefits reduction may be imposed. In this paper we give an overview of the literature on the effects of sanctions in social welfare systems and we present first results on the effects of sanctions for young unemployed welfare recipients based on German administrative data. The German welfare system is particularly strict for young individuals. We distinguish between mild and strong sanctions and we focus on the impact of these sanctions on job finding probabilities. Our results suggest that each type of sanction leads to an increased transition rate to work, and that this effect is higher for strong sanctions. However, strong sanctions for young welfare recipients involve a complete withdrawal of the basic cash transfer payments.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/106293
    Series: Working paper / IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy ; 2013:26
    Subjects: monitoring; welfare; youth unemployment; duration models; unemployment benefits; social assistance
    Scope: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information
    Author: Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J.
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from him. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so-called burning of money, where the monetary penalty is given away to a third party. We show that a more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible by exploiting the timing of private information. If the private information arrives before the agent has completed his effort, non-monetary tools like rescaling the project become optimal, and no money needs to be burned. We show that rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties, while money is equally valuable to all parties. An alternative way to solve the principal’s credibility problem is to certify the private signal and make it public. When collusion between the certifier and the agent is an issue, we uncover interesting similarities between private signals and public (certified) signals vulnerable to collusive manipulation. We show that certification of private information by a third party may not always be in the interest of the principal if this certification raises the specter of collusion.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89755
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4497
    Subjects: monitoring; unverifiable signal; certification; private communication; timing of information; collusion; non-monetary penalties; burning money
    Scope: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Non-strategic punishment when monitoring is costly
    experimental evidence on differences between second and third party behavior
    Author: Goeschl, Timo; Jarke, Johannes Stephan
    Published: June 11, 2013
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Heidelberg ; Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg

    This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage,... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 532 (545)
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    This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less, the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from second parties, not just more weakly.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/127356
    Series: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 545
    Subjects: monitoring; punishment; sanctions; information; cooperation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Tit for others ́tat
    repeated prisonerś dilemma experiments with third-party monitoring and indirect punishment
    Author: Bruttel, Lisa; Güth, Werner
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisonerś Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 78 (2013,43)
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    Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisonerś Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a four-person infinite horizon game allows for Folk-Theorem-like voluntary cooperation. We ask whether monitoring and indirect punishment with the help of others are comparable to direct monitoring and punishment in establishing and maintaining voluntary cooperation. The treatment effects we find are rather weak. Others ́monitoring of own activities is only an insufficient substitute for direct observability.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/98457
    Series: Jena economic research papers ; 2013-043
    Subjects: Gefangenendilemma; Folk-Theorem; Kooperatives Spiel; Experiment; experiment; monitoring; prisoner’s dilemma
    Scope: Online-Ressource (16 S.), graph. Darst.