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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Topics in dynamic games
    Author: Kosenok, Grigory
    Published: 2005

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    B 348413
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Print
    Subjects: Dynamisches Spiel; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Theorie; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; monitoring
    Scope: III, 139 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. Enth. 3 Beitr

    Zugl.: Madison, Wis., Univ. of Wisconsin - Madison, Diss., 2005
  2. Multiple-bank lending
    diversification and free-riding in monitoring [[Elektronische Ressource]]
    Author: Carletti, Elena; Cerasi, Vittoria; Daltung, Sonja
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main

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  3. Timing of verification procedures
    monitoring versus auditing
    Author: Strausz, Roland
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, München

    This paper studies the strategic effect of a difference in timing of verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (33)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper studies the strategic effect of a difference in timing of verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if 1) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or 2) steep incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability. verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if 1) steep incentives structures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or 2) steep incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93845
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 33
    Subjects: timing of verification; double moral hazard; monitoring; auditi
    Scope: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.