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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Tiered information disclosure
    an empirical analysis of the advance peek into the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment
    Author: Wu, Weishao; Liu, Wenchien; Suardi, Sandy; Chang, Yuanchen
    Published: May 2017
    Publisher:  University of Wollongong, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Wollongong, NSW

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 12 (2018,1)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: School of Accounting, Economics and Finance working paper series ; WP 18, 01
    Subjects: Informed trading; high frequency traders; advance peek; information efficiency; price discovery
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Prediction markets and poll releases
    when are prices most informative?
    Author: Brown, Alasdair; Reade, J. James; Vaughan Williams, Leighton
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Department of Economics, University of Reading ; no. 134
    Subjects: Prediction markets; opinion polls; price efficiency; information efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Heterogeneous agent models in finance
    Author: Dieci, Roberto; He, Xue-zhong
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Quantitative Finance Research Centre, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 864
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Research paper / Quantitative Finance Research Centre ; 389 (January 2018)
    Subjects: Heterogeneity; bounded rationality; heterogeneous agent-based models; stylized facts; asset pricing; housing bubbles; limit order markets; information efficiency; comovement
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 96 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. I spy with my little eye... a banking crisis
    early warnings and incentive schemes in banks
    Author: Hakenes, Hendrik; Schlegel, Friederike
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    The severity and depth of the recent financial crisis hit many by surprise. Despite warning signs, the financial system seems to have been unable to aggregate existing information. As the events of Fall 2008 showed, many investors were caught off... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (5140)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The severity and depth of the recent financial crisis hit many by surprise. Despite warning signs, the financial system seems to have been unable to aggregate existing information. As the events of Fall 2008 showed, many investors were caught off guard by the large number of banks collapsing worldwide. But what triggers an early warning, and what are the incentives to implement such a trigger? We construct a theoretical model of a bank that is financed with debt and equity, and a bank manager monitoring the bank’s loan portfolio. The manager must be incentivized to warn the board before a crisis. However, we show that the board may implement a contract with insufficient incentives to communicate a warning, as refinancing conditions deteriorate when lenders notice an upcoming crisis. We discuss policies to improve information efficiency and give conditions under which regulatory measures, such as capital and liquidity regulation, increase welfare.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107361
    Series: Array ; 5140
    Subjects: banking crises; information propagation; information efficiency; incentives; compensation regulation
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 36 S.), graph. Darst.