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  1. Characterization of the set of equilibria in max-min group contests with continuous efforts and a private good prize
    Published: July 2024
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    We characterise the set of equilibria in a deterministic group contest with the weakest-link impact function, continuous efforts and a private good prize, complementing the results obtained by Chowdhury et al. (2016). We consider a two-stages... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 125
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    We characterise the set of equilibria in a deterministic group contest with the weakest-link impact function, continuous efforts and a private good prize, complementing the results obtained by Chowdhury et al. (2016). We consider a two-stages two-groups model, where in the first stage the agents simultaneously choose the sharing rule, while in the second stage they choose efforts. Despite the existence of within-group symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the effort stage, there are combinations of possible sharing rules such that no pure strategy effort equilibria exist, hence for these sharing rules, the continuation payoffs are not defined, so that there exist no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure stragies. However, limiting ourselves to the restricted sharing rules case, we are able to state that there are continua of subgame perfect equilibria. In this case, by additional restrictions on the effort levels of each class of effort equilibria, we are able to computationally characterise the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/301108
    Series: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2024, 21
    Subjects: Group contests; sharing rules; indeterminacy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten)
  2. The set of equilibria in max-min two groups contests with binary actions and a private good prize
    Published: June 2024
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a "max-min group... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 125
    No inter-library loan

     

    In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a "max-min group contest", as defined by Chowdhury et al. (2016). However, instead of a continuum effort set, we employ a binary action set. Further, we consider private good prizes, so that there is a sharing issue within the winning group. Therefore, we include two stages: the first one about the setting of a sharing rule parameter and the second one about simultaneous and independent actions' choices. The binary action set allow us to innovate on the existing literature by (i) characterizing the full set of the second stage equilibrium actions; (ii) computationally characterizing in MATLAB the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entire game. We find conditions such that the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies have the cardinality of the continuum. We also check whether this paper's results are due to discreteness or to binary choice, proving that in this case there are no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as proved in the continuum case in Gilli and Sorrentino (2024).

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/300189
    Series: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2024, 08
    Subjects: Group contests; sharing rules; indeterminacy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Monetary policy in the Euro Area
    active or passive?
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 718
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: DEMS working paper series ; no. 535 (May 2024)
    Subjects: monetary policy; indeterminacy; euro area; business cycle fluctuations; inflation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The set of equilibria in max-min two groups contests with binary actions and a private good prize
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 718
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: DEMS working paper series ; no. 539 (June 2024)
    Subjects: Group contests; sharing rules; indeterminacy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Max-min group contests continuous efforts and a private good prize
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 718
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: DEMS working paper series ; no. 541 (July 2024)
    Subjects: Group contests; sharing rules; indeterminacy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen