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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 449
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    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1867 (August 2022)
    Subjects: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers'... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers' decisions to invest, and where underinvestment is more severe for higher productivity firms. A rule of origin offers preferred market access for final goods if a sufficiently high fraction of inputs used in the production process is sourced within the trading bloc. Such a rule alters behavior for only a subset of suppliers, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply with the rule in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers choose not to comply. For those suppliers it does affect, the rule increases investment, but it also induces excessive sourcing (for given investment) within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, it is best to have a rule that affects high-productivity suppliers. The reason is that the marginal net welfare gain from tightening the rule increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a strict rule of origin is socially desirable; in contrast, when industry productivity is low, no rule of origin is likely to help. Regardless of the case, a sufficiently strict rule can (weakly) ensure welfare gains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265955
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9920 (2022)
    Subjects: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1634 (2021,20 rev.)
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    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Edition: Revised March 4, 2021
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 38 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 3, 2022" - Seite 1
  4. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Author: Adachi-Sato, Meg
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1634 (2021,20 rev. 2)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Edition: Revised May 6, 2022
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Subjects: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Scope: 36 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 9, 2022" - Seite 1

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. The organizational economics of school chains
    Author: Neri, Lorenzo; Pasini, Elisabetta; Silva, Olmo
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4
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    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists on the determinants and effects of differences in the organizational set-up of school chains. Our work aims to fill this gap. We use some of the key insights of the organizational economics of firms to study the organization of school chains. We match survey information on decentralization decisions of procurement activities for approximately 400 chains and 2,000 schools in England to student-, school and market-level administrative records. We find that chains with a larger share of schools whose leadership background is aligned with the chain board's expertise, younger chains, and chains that are closer to the market value-added (productivity) frontier decentralize more. We find instead no association between the value-added heterogeneity of the markets in which chains operate and their decision to delegate. We also investigate the link between the structures of chains and their students' performance. We find no association between decentralization and performance. This is consistent with the intuition that chains choose their organization in ways that maximize output (i.e., students' learning) and so the equilibrium relationship between performance and organizational set-up is flat.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263658
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15442
    Subjects: school chains; school autonomy; organizational economics; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Author: Sampson, Thomas
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 449
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    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1826 (February 2022)
    Subjects: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Author: Sampson, Thomas
    Published: January 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
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    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. The paper introduces a new taxonomy of value chains based on whether or not the headquarters firm benefits from imitation of its supplier’s technology. In inclusive value chains, where imitation is beneficial, the headquarters firm promotes technology diffusion. By contrast, in exclusive value chains headquarters seeks to limit supplier imitation. The paper analyzes how this distinction affects the returns to offshoring, the welfare effects of technical change and the social efficiency of knowledge sharing. Weaker intellectual property rights over input production technologies raise welfare when value chains are inclusive, but have the opposite effect under exclusive value chains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252049
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9532 (2022)
    Subjects: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen