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Displaying results 1 to 9 of 9.

  1. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191 (304)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/192913
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 304
    Subjects: Trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Blockchain
    the birth of decentralized governance
    Author: Arruñada, Benito; Garicano, Luis
    Published: April 2018
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1038
    Subjects: blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Blockchain: the birth of decentralized governance
    Author: Arruñada, Benito; Garicano, Luis
    Published: April 2018
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics working paper series ; no. 1608
    Subjects: blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. In-house and arm's length
    productivity heterogeneity and variation in organizational form
    Author: Kalnins, Arturs; Lin, Stephen; Thomas, Catherine
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CEP discussion paper ; no 1579 (October 2018)
    Subjects: firm heterogeneity; firm structure; incomplete contracts; outsourcing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Preferential trade agreements and global sourcing
    Author: Bickwit, Grant; Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CEP discussion paper ; no 1581 (October 2018)
    Subjects: regionalism; hold-up problem; sourcing; trade diversion; matching; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn, Germany

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (11917)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/193211
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 11917
    Subjects: trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The causal effect of trust
    Author: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7324)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Trust affects almost all human relationships - in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people's beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185522
    Series: Array ; no. 7324
    Subjects: trust; causality; equilibrium selection; belief distortions; incomplete contracts; screening; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Preferential trade agreements and global sourcing
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John L.; Bickwit, Grant
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    We study how a preferential trade agreement (PTA) affects international sourcing decisions, aggregate productivity and welfare under incomplete contracting and endogenous matching. Contract incompleteness implies underinvestment. That inefficiency is... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7327)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study how a preferential trade agreement (PTA) affects international sourcing decisions, aggregate productivity and welfare under incomplete contracting and endogenous matching. Contract incompleteness implies underinvestment. That inefficiency is mitigated by a PTA, because the agreement allows the parties in a vertical chain to internalize a larger return from the investment. This raises aggregate productivity. On the other hand, the agreement yields sourcing diversion. More efficient suppliers tilt the tradeoff toward the (potentially) beneficial relationship-strengthening effect; a high external tariff tips it toward harmful sourcing diversion. A PTA also affects the structure of vertical chains in the economy. As tariff preferences attract too many matches to the bloc, the average productivity of the industry tends to fall. When the agreement incorporates "deep integration" provisions, it boosts trade flows, but not necessarily welfare. Rather, "deep integration" improves upon "shallow integration" if and only if the original investment inefficiencies are serious enough. On the whole, we offer a new framework to study the benefits and costs from preferential liberalization in the context of global sourcing.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185525
    Series: Array ; no. 7327
    Subjects: regionalism; hold-up problem; sourcing; trade diversion; matching; incomplete contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Productivity and firm boundaries
    Author: Kohler, Wilhelm; Smolka, Marcel
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    This paper develops and applies a test of the property rights theory of the firm in the context of global input sourcing. We use the model by Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman, "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, 112:3 (2004), 552-80, to... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (7214)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper develops and applies a test of the property rights theory of the firm in the context of global input sourcing. We use the model by Pol Antràs and Elhanan Helpman, "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, 112:3 (2004), 552-80, to derive a new prediction regarding how the productivity of a firm affects its choice between vertical integration and outsourcing and how this effect depends on the relative input intensity of the production process. The prediction we derive hinges on less restrictive assumptions than industry-level predictions available in existing literature and survives in more realistic versions of the model featuring multiple suppliers and partial vertical integration. We present robust firm-level evidence from Spain showing that, in line with our prediction, the effect of productivity works more strongly in favor of vertical integration, and against outsourcing, in more headquarter-intensive industries.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185412
    Series: Array ; no. 7214
    Subjects: global sourcing; incomplete contracts; property rights theory; firm productivity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen