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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Communication and trust in principal-team relationships
    experimental evidence
    Author: Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    We study how upward communication - from workers to managers - about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 62 (2015,6)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study how upward communication - from workers to managers - about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be detrimental to workers ́performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with workers ́payments, and in workers being more sensitive to the perceived kindness of their relative wage payments. By varying the source and degree of information about individual efforts between treatments, we see that precise knowledge about workers ́actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers ́self-assessments can be a problematic tool to gather this information.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/118664
    Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2015/06
    Subjects: reciprocity; incomplete contracts; communication; laboratory experiment; gift exchange; performance appraisal; self-assessment; work team
    Scope: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Global sourcing of heterogeneous firms
    theory and evidence
    Author: Kohler, Wilhelm; Smolka, Marcel
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    This paper investigates the role of firm productivity in drawing firm boundaries in global sourcing. Our analysis focuses on how productivity affects the allocation of ownership rights between the headquarter of a firm and an intermediate input... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (5184)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper investigates the role of firm productivity in drawing firm boundaries in global sourcing. Our analysis focuses on how productivity affects the allocation of ownership rights between the headquarter of a firm and an intermediate input supplier (vertical integration vs. outsourcing), as well as the location of intermediate input production (offshore vs. domestic). Unlike previous work, we allow for a fully flexible productivity effect with varying magnitude and sign across different industries. Our estimation strategy is motivated by the canonical economic model of sourcing due to Antràs & Helpman (2004). This model invokes the property rights theory of the firm in order to pin down firm boundaries as the outcome of an interaction between firm heterogeneity and the industry's sourcing intensity (i.e. the importance of inputs sourced from suppliers relative to headquarter inputs). We demonstrate that, at the level of the firm, the model implies a productivity effect that varies not just in magnitude (and potentially non-monotonically), but also in sign with the sourcing intensity of the industry. To estimate the effects empirically, we use Spanish firm-level data from the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE). We find a pattern of effects whereby productivity stimulates vertical integration in industries of low sourcing intensity, but favors outsourcing in industries of high sourcing intensity. Moreover, we find that productivity boosts offshoring throughout all industries, with the effect increasing monotonically in the sourcing intensity. Our results lend strong empirical support to the property rights view of the firm in the global economy.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107316
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 5184
    Subjects: global sourcing; incomplete contracts; firm productivity; firm-level data
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 39 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Communication and trust in principal-team relationships
    experimental evidence
    Author: Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    We study how upward communication - from workers to managers - about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 4 (8762)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study how upward communication - from workers to managers - about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be detrimental to workers' performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with workers' payments, and in workers being more sensitive to the perceived kindness of their relative wage payments. By varying the source and degree of information about individual efforts between treatments, we see that precise knowledge about workers' actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers' self-assessments can be a problematic tool to gather this information.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107547
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 8762
    Subjects: communication; gift exchange; incomplete contracts; reciprocity; performance appraisal; self-assessment; work team; laboratory experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (32 S.), graph. Darst.