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  1. Exit options and the allocation of authority
    Author: Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Freie Univ. Berlin, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Berlin

    We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 79 (2013,5)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74793
    Series: Array ; 2013/5
    Subjects: Authority; decision rights; exit options; incomplete contracts; asymmetric information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.)
  2. Exit options and the allocation of authority
    Author: Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (401)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93927
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 401
    Subjects: Authority; decision rights; exit options; incomplete contracts; asymmetric information
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S., 189,73 KB)
  3. Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem
    Author: Erlei, Mathias; Roß, Wiebke
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Techn. Univ., Clausthal-Zellerfeld

    We provide experimental evidence for the hypothesis that bounded rationality is an important element of the theory of the firm. We implement a simplified version of a mechanism designed to perfectly solve the holdup problem under conditions of... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 498 (9)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We provide experimental evidence for the hypothesis that bounded rationality is an important element of the theory of the firm. We implement a simplified version of a mechanism designed to perfectly solve the holdup problem under conditions of perfect rationality (Maskin 2002). We test whether this mechanism is able to perfectly solve our experimental holdup problem or may at least improve economic performance. We find that this is not the case: the implementation of the mechanism worsens economic performance. We reconstruct the main features of participants' behavior by applying the logit agent quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998) as an equilibrium concept that takes players' potential mistakes into account.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107450
    Edition: Version: October 2014
    Series: TUC working papers in economics ; 9
    Subjects: Bounded rationality; transaction costs; incomplete contracts; experiment; mechanism design
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.