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  1. Monitoring and pay
    an experiment on employee performance under endogenous supervision
    Author: Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  Univ., Volkswirtschaftl. Fak., München

    We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 483 (2011,09)
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/104352
    Edition: This version: 11 January 2011
    Series: Munich discussion paper ; 2011-9
    Subjects: Effizienzlohn; Leistungsbeurteilung; Leistungsanreiz; Leistungsmotivation; Austauschtheorie; Experiment; Theorie; incentive contracts; supervision; efficiency wages; experiment; incomplete contracts; reciprocity
    Scope: Online-Ressource (39 S., 754 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Institutions and contract enforcement
    Author: Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, William Bentley
    Published: 2011
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (361)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms' use of firing threat as an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93934
    Series: Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 361
    Subjects: Arbeitsvertrag; Leistungsmotivation; Kündigungsschutz; Leistungsentgelt; Experiment; incomplete contracts; bonus pay; efficiency wages; employment protection; firing costs; experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource ([1], 46, [9] S., 566 KB), graph. Darst.