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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. An exploratory study of how sleep restriction impacts choice in two classic normal form games
    Author: Dickinson, David L.
    Published: February 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Department of Economics working paper / Appalachian State University ; number 18, 02
    Subjects: Sleep deprivation; game theory; heuristics; experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. High-frequency trading
    insights from analytical models and simulated agent-based models
    Author: Kalimullina, Lina
    Published: 2018

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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Clausthal
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    Fachhochschule Erfurt, Hochschulbibliothek
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Universität Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Bibliothek der Hochschule Hannover
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    Bibliothek im Kurt-Schwitters-Forum
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Zentrale Hochschulbibliothek Lübeck
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Hochschulbibliothek
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    Hochschule Osnabrück, Bibliothek Campus Westerberg
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    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Standort Stendal, Bibliothek
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    Universitätsbibliothek der Eberhard Karls Universität
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    UB Weimar
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10900/87097
    Subjects: Markt; Hochfrequenz; Handel; Spieltheorie; Mikrostruktur; high-frequency trading; market microstructure; game theory; agent-based models; artificial markets; trading strategies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 209 Blätter)
    Notes:

    Dissertation ist erst 2019 erschienen

    Dissertation, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, 2019
  3. Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering
    clash or cooperation?
    Author: Heyen, Daniel; Horton, Joshua B.; Moreno Cruz, Juan
    Published: December 2018
    Publisher:  Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, [London, UK]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy working paper ; no. 345
    Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment working paper ; no. 313
    Subjects: climate intervention; solar geoengineering; counter-geoengineering; free driver; strategic conflicts; game theory; cooperation; externality; global warming; international environmental agreements
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The effects of the assign-back provision on R&D
    an application of the guidelines of the European Union, the United States and Japan
    Author: Hatanaka, Kaori
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 649
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: GRIPS discussion paper ; 17, 17
    Subjects: license contract; grant-back; game theory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering
    clash or cooperation
    Author: Heyen, Daniel; Horton, Joshua B.; Moreno Cruz, Juan
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern surrounding these technologies is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63 (7180)
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    Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern surrounding these technologies is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favor of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of asymmetric countries allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that the free-driver outcome becomes unstable once counter-geoengineering is available, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/185378
    Series: Array ; no. 7180
    Subjects: climate intervention; solar geoengineering; counter-geoengineering; free-driver; strategic conflicts; game theory; cooperation; externality; global warming; international environmental agreements
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The role of problem specification in crowdsourcing contests for design problems
    a theoretical and empirical analysis
    Author: Jiang, Zhaohui; Huang, Yan; Beil, Damian R.
    Published: [2018]
    Publisher:  Michigan Ross, [Ann Arbor, MI]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 68 (1388)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2027.42/146143
    Series: Ross School of Business working paper ; no. 1388 (October 2018)
    Subjects: crowdsourcing contests; problem specification; design; game theory; empirical analysis
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Who runs first to the bank?
    = Ki rohan a bankba?
    Author: Kiss, Hubert János; Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
    Published: October 2018
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors differ in their liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the first one, depositors choose the level of costly effort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which... more

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    We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors differ in their liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the first one, depositors choose the level of costly effort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which determines the order of decisions. In the second stage, depositors decide whether to withdraw or to keep the funds deposited. We consider two different informational environments (simultaneous and sequential) that differ in whether or not depositors can observe the decision of others during the second stage of the game. We show theoretically that the informational environment affects the emergence of bank runs and thus should influence the willingness to rush to the bank. We test the predictions in the lab, where we gather extensive data on individual traits to account for depositors' heterogeneity; e.g. socio-demographics, uncertainty attitudes or personality traits. We find no significant differences in the costly effort to arrive early at the bank neither across the informational environments, nor according to the liquidity needs of the depositors. In the sequential environment, some depositors rush to the bank because they are irrational and do not recognize the benefits of observability in fostering the coordination on the no-bank run outcome. There is also evidence that some depositors rush to keep their funds deposited and to facilitate coordination on the efficient outcome. Finally, we document that loss aversion is an important factor in the formation of the line.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222039
    Series: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2018, 26
    Subjects: bank runs; coordination problems; endogenous formation of lines; loss aversion; risk aversion; experimental economics; game theory; sequential games; simultaneous games
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen