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  1. Private sector involvement in water services
    theoretical foundations and empirical evidence
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  TSE, Toulouse

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 330 (590)
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; 590
    Subjects: water services; public-private partnerships; auctioning; game theory; water prices
    Scope: Online-Ressource (24 S.)
  2. Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  TSE, Toulouse

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 330 (561)
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; 561
    Subjects: maximizing behavior; game theory; inclusive fitness; invadability; Nash equilibrium
    Scope: Online-Ressource (61 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Az összekapcsoltság hatása a rendszerkockázatra homogén bankrendszerben
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    The most fundamental form of systemic risk in modern financial networks is contagion. In this article we describe a homogeneous banking system (banks with identical preferences and the same size of total assets) with interconnectedness: banks own... more

    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 151 (2015,10)
    No inter-library loan

     

    The most fundamental form of systemic risk in modern financial networks is contagion. In this article we describe a homogeneous banking system (banks with identical preferences and the same size of total assets) with interconnectedness: banks own shares in each others' assets. Using these simplifications we derive an analytically tractable indicator for systemic risk based on the expected loss of banks in case of a default in the system. Analyzing this indicator we find that increasing the volatility of the assets and decreasing the level of equity both raises systemic risk. Furthermore, interconnectedness in the system has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand it increases the diversification effect because banks can cover losses by holding assets of other banks. On the other hand if the connection is strong at the beginning, increasing it further induces additional systemic risk by raising the probability of contagion.

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: Hungarian
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9786155447693
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129849
    Series: Discussion papers / Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; 2015/10
    Subjects: systemic risk; interbank market; financial contagion; game theory
    Scope: Online-Ressource (22 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in engl. Sprache