Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Narrow Search
Search narrowed by
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Macroeconomies as constructively rational games
    Author: Sinitskaya, Ekaterina; Tesfatsion, Leigh
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Iowa State Univ., Dep. of Economics, Ames, Iowa

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Rev.
    Series: Working papers series / Iowa State University, Department of Economics ; 14018
    Subjects: Macroeconomics; agent-based modeling; game theory; intertemporal optimization; learning; constructive rationality
    Scope: Online-Ressource (50 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Consumer behaviour in a social context
    implications for environmental policy
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ. of St. Andrews, School of Economics & Finance, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: School of Economics & Finance discussion papers ; 1407
    Subjects: consumer behaviour; social context; environmental policy; game theory; competitive consumption; consumption norms; altruism; moral behaviour; Kantian calculus
    Scope: Online-Ressource (36 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions
    Author: Bayar, Güzin
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Kiel Inst. for the World Economy, Kiel

    To solve the corruption problem, its root causes should first be diagnosed and factors supporting it should be determined. One of the important facilitators of corrupt transactions are intermediaries, who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 112 (2014,26)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    To solve the corruption problem, its root causes should first be diagnosed and factors supporting it should be determined. One of the important facilitators of corrupt transactions are intermediaries, who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are 'spurious' intermediaries who obtain bribes from public services by pretending they can ensure a service is completed even though they have no such influence over the issue. This deception may continue even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such a deception. From the solutions of the model, some policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring are derived.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/97838
    Series: Economics / Discussion papers ; 2014-26
    Subjects: Corruption; spurious middlemen; game theory
    Scope: Online-Ressource (26 S.)
  4. Shared responsibilities in international law
    a political economy analysis
    Author: Aaken, Anne van
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ. of St. Gallen Law School, St. Gallen

    Problems which can only be resolved through international cooperation are increasing. Due to this increase, states cooperate more than ever with each other and with international organizations (IOs) but often insufficiently to solve the problems.... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Problems which can only be resolved through international cooperation are increasing. Due to this increase, states cooperate more than ever with each other and with international organizations (IOs) but often insufficiently to solve the problems. When social scientists analyze the potential for cooperation on global public goods, they focus on the benefits from cooperation and on the game theoretic structures under which cooperation may arise; they have until now, however, neglected to study state responsibility as a sanctioning mechanism and especially its different forms of apportionment when responsibility is shared. I submit that this is a crucial variable for understanding why cooperation arises since it impacts the propensity to cooperate in the first place. Different rules of apportionment under Art. 47 Draft Articles on State Responsibility lead to different cooperative outcomes. Taking into account other goals of state responsibility such as compensation and prevention of harm, it is possible via game theory to construct an optimal apportionment of responsibility in situations of shared responsibility. In principle, independent responsibility, the current general principle, is worst for the propensity to cooperate, proportional responsibility best and joint and several liability lies in the middle of the extremes, although it is best from a compensatory perspective.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Law and Economics Research Paper Series / 2014,04
    Working paper / University of St. Gallen Law School ; 2014,04
    Subjects: international Law; state responsibility; shared responsibility; international public goods; cooperation; game theory
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 36 S.)
  5. International environmental agreements with uncertainty, learning and risk aversion
    Author: Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro; Ulph, Alistair
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (4589)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and another that explores the implications of uncertainty and risk aversion on IEA formation under no learning. Combining learning and risk aversion seems appropriate as the uncertainties surrounding many international environmental problems are still large, those uncertainties are often highly correlated as for instance in climate change and hence pooling risks may be limited, but those uncertainties are gradually reduced over time through learning. It is shown that the negative conclusion with respect to the role of learning derived for risk neutrality has to be qualified: below a threshold level of risk aversion learning can impact positively on the success of IEAs, above the threshold the opposite is true. Moreover, in a world without full learning (i.e. partial and no learning), risk aversion can lead to better outcomes, but only if risk aversion is sufficiently high.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93468
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4589
    Subjects: international environmental agreements; uncertainty; learning and risk aversion; game theory
    Scope: Online-Ressource (30 S.)