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  1. Evidential equilibria
    heuristics and biases in static games
    Author: Dhami, Sanjit S.; Al-Nowaihi, Ali
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Univ. of Leicester, Dep. of Economics, Leicester

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
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    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / University of Leicester, Department of Economics ; 13/25
    Subjects: evidential reasoning; game theory; cognitive bias; prisoners dilemma game; oligopoly games; conservative heuristics; radical heuristics; decision making
    Scope: Online-Ressource (47 S.), Ill.
  2. Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers
    Author: Csóka, Péter; Havran, Dániel; Szűcs, Nóra
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 151 (2013,22)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the effrts of the borrower. We define the optimal debt contract in two cases. In the symmetric case the lender and the borrower has the same information about the buyer, its probability of default. In the asymmetric case the borrower learns whether the buyer will pay or not before choosing her level of efforts. We prove that in the asymmetric case the borrowing capacity and the welfare of the society is weakly smaller than in the symmetric case. We also show that the nonnegative default risk of a buyer weakly decreases borrowing capacity compared to the case when the buyer pays for sure. However, it turns out that having a risky buyer might increase borrowing capacity and welfare.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9786155243790
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/108316
    Series: Discussion papers / Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; 2013/22
    Subjects: game theory; moral hazard; corporate financing; trade credit
    Scope: Online-Ressource (19 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in ungar. Sprache