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  1. Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments
    conference paper
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    Federal states in Germany are characterized by low fiscal autonomy. Equalization systems in place balance revenue differences to a considerable extent and states cannot independently set taxes of any major relevance. Although these features of German... more

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DSM 13
    No inter-library loan

     

    Federal states in Germany are characterized by low fiscal autonomy. Equalization systems in place balance revenue differences to a considerable extent and states cannot independently set taxes of any major relevance. Although these features of German federalism are notorious for their disincentives none of the recent reform initiatives of German federalism have been able to change the system. This study makes use of a unique survey among the members of all 16 state parliaments to explain the formation of autonomy preferences. It tests to which extent the preferences of state policy makers for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results point, inter alia, to the role of state deficit and the structural differences between states. States with high permanent deficits are more opposed to tax autonomy and more in favour of higher fiscal equalization transfers.

     

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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79736
    Series: Array ; V2
    Subjects: fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZEW, Mannheim

    Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this... more

    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    No inter-library loan
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
    Online-Ressource
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 15 (2013,90)
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    No inter-library loan

     

    Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states’ self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/88117
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; No. 13-090
    Subjects: fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism
    Scope: Online-Ressource (43 S.), graph. Darst.