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Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. Efficient systems for the securities transaction industry - a framework for the European Union
    Author: Serifsoy, Baris; Weiss, Marco
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QP 700 ; QB 910
    Series: Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 120
    Subjects: Wertpapierhandel; Börse; Effizienz; Europäische Union; Effekten; Wertpapier
    Other subjects: (stw)Wertpapierhandel; (stw)Börse; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)EU-Staaten; trading; clearing; settlement; straight-through processing; centralcounterparty; regulation; efficiency; EU; consistent systems; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  2. Speculation in standard auctions with resale
    Author: Garratt, Rod; Tröger, Thomas
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, München

    In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator' a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 445 (42)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator' a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93946
    Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 42
    Subjects: standard auctions; speculation; resale; efficiency
    Scope: Online-Ressource (21, 44 S.)