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  1. Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
    Author: Beccuti, Juan I.
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ., Fac. of Economics and Social Sciences, Dep. of Economics, Bern

    This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyer's willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private... more

    Location:
    Bibliothek der Hochschule Hannover
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 182 (2014,1)
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    This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyer's willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot achieve greater payoffs than those obtained by posting a price in each period. However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is sufficiently impatient relative to the seller. It is also proved that a mechanism à la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/126629
    Series: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 14-01
    Subjects: asymmetric information; imperfect commitment; dynamics; mechanism design; non-optimality of posting prices
    Scope: Online-Ressource (23 S.), graph. Darst.
  2. Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
    extending to the multi-period case
    Author: Beccuti, Juan I.
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ., Fac. of Economics and Social Sciences, Dep. of Economics, Bern

    This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The... more

    Location:
    Bibliothek der Hochschule Hannover
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 182 (2014,2)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The seller can commit to the current period mechanism but not to future ones. Our main result is that a seller cannot do better than posting a price in every period. We give a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism and equilibrium payoffs for every prior. Also, we show that, when agents are arbitrarily patient, the seller does not learn about buyer's type except in extreme cases, posting a price equal to the minimum buyer's willingness to pay in every period. This result is a reminiscence of the Coase's conjecture, where a monopolist cannot exert her monopoly power due to the lack of long-term commitment.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/126617
    Series: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 14-02
    Subjects: asymmetric information; dynamics; optimal mechanism; imperfect commitment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. The impact of R&D cooperations on drug variety offered on the market
    evidence from the pharmaceutical industry
    Author: Banerjee, Tannista; Siebert, Ralph
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    Our study puts special attention to the fact that R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical industry are formed at different stages throughout the drug development process. We study if the timing to engage in R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical... more

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (4567)
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    Our study puts special attention to the fact that R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical industry are formed at different stages throughout the drug development process. We study if the timing to engage in R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical industry has different impacts on the technology and product markets. Using a comprehensive dataset on the pharmaceutical industry, and estimating a heterogeneous treatment effects model (Heckman et al., 2006) our results show that R&D cooperations formed at the early stages increase the number of R&D projects and the number of drugs launched on the product market. Most interestingly, late stage R&D cooperations significantly reduce the number of drugs launched on the market, even though they increased firms' activity in the technology markets. This result highlights the fact that firms re-optimize their drug development portfolio to avoid wasteful duplication and cannibalizing the sales of the jointly developed drug in R&D cooperations. Our study show that firms cooperating in late stage collaborations re-optimize their individual drug development portfolios, which significantly reduces the number of drugs offered on the market.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/89747
    Series: Array ; 4567
    Subjects: drug development; dynamics; co-development; pharmaceutical industry; product variety; product market competition; Research and Development cooperation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (44 S.)
  4. Dynamics of military conflict
    an economics perspective
    Author: Beckmann, Klaus; Reimer, Lennart
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Helmut-Schmidt-Univ., Hamburg

    Using examples for each type of model, we consider dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that... more

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 2 (138)
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    Using examples for each type of model, we consider dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that computational requirements and theoretical difficulties impose tight limits on what can be achieved using the first two approaches. In particular, we are unable to study dynamic military conflict as a series of “battles” that are resolved individually. A simulation study based on a new model of adaptive, boundedly rational decision making, however, is shown not to be subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and standard tenets of military theory.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/98417
    Series: Diskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre ; 138
    Subjects: Conflict; dynamics; contest success functions; differential games; dynamic games; simulation; emergence of war
    Scope: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.