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  1. Optimal design of private litigation
    Published: 08/2017
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    This article translates and extends Becker (1968) from public law enforcement to private litigation by examining optimal legal system design in a model with private suits, signals of case strength, court error, and two types of primary behavior:... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    This article translates and extends Becker (1968) from public law enforcement to private litigation by examining optimal legal system design in a model with private suits, signals of case strength, court error, and two types of primary behavior: harmful acts that may be deterred and benign acts that may be chilled. The instruments examined are filing fees or subsidies that may be imposed on either party, damage awards and payments by unsuccessful plaintiffs (each of which may be decoupled), and the stringency of the evidence threshold (burden of proof). With no constraints, results arbitrarily close to the first best can be implemented. Prior analyses of optimal damage awards, decoupling, and fee shifting are shown to involve special cases. More important, previous results change qualitatively when implicit assumptions are relaxed. For example, introducing a filing fee can make it optimal to minimize what losing plaintiffs pay winning defendants and to reduce the evidence threshold as much as possible — even though the direct effect of these adjustments is to chill desirable behavior, a key feature absent in prior work

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 928
    Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper ; No. 928
    Subjects: : litigation; law enforcement; courts; fee shifting; decoupling; filing fees; burden ofproof
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten)
  2. Judicial politics and sentencing decisions
    Published: December 19, 2017
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 943 (12/2017)
    Subjects: racial and gender disparities; criminal sentencing; courts; judicial politics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
  3. Contingent judicial deference
    theory and application to usury laws
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  CFM, Centre for Macroeconomics, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 637
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CFM discussion paper series ; CFM-DP 2017, 29 (September 2017)
    Subjects: adjudication; courts; prohibitions; interest rate cap
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Do jurors and professional judges differ in their treatment of crime?
    evidence from French reform
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    VS 330
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 17-763 (February 2017)
    Subjects: courts; sentencing; crime; judicial decision; jury members
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Preordered service in contract enforcement
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  University of Exeter, Department of Economics, Exeter

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    VS 226 (2017,04)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 17, 04
    Subjects: Judicial system; courts; judiciary performance; legal procedure; civil cases; caseload; contract enforcement; population of investment games; experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen