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Displaying results 1 to 9 of 9.

  1. Leverage constraints and bank monitoring: bank regulation versus monetary policy
    Author: Böser, Florian; Gersbach, Hans
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    Bank leverage constraints can emerge from regulatory capital requirements as well as from central bank collateral requirements in reserve lending facilities. While these two channels are usually examined separately, we are able to compare them with... more

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    Bank leverage constraints can emerge from regulatory capital requirements as well as from central bank collateral requirements in reserve lending facilities. While these two channels are usually examined separately, we are able to compare them with the help of a bank money creation model in which central bank reserves have to be acquired to settle interbank liabilities. In particular, we show that with regard to bank monitoring, monetary policy via collateral requirements leads to a unique collateral leverage channel, which cannot be replicated by standard capital requirements. Through this channel, banks can expand loan supply and deposit issuance when they face liquidity constraints, by raising the collateral value of their loans with tighter monitoring of firms. The collateral leverage channel can improve welfare beyond standard bank capital regulation. Our results may inform current policy debates, such as the design of central bank collateral frameworks or the question whether monetary policy remains effective in times with large central bank reserves.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235624
    Edition: This version: June 30, 2021
    Series: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 21, 358 (June 2021)
    Subjects: leverage; banks; monitoring; bank regulation; monetary policy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Regulatory and bailout decisions in a banking union
    Author: Haufler, Andreas
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors differ in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory (super- visory)... more

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    We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors differ in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory (super- visory) decision of which banks are to be shut down before they can go bankrupt, and (ii) a bailout decision of who pays for banks that have failed despite regu- latory oversight. Each of these choices can either be taken in a centralized or in a decentralized way. In our benchmark model the two countries always agree on a centralized regulation policy. In contrast, bailout policies are centralized only when international spillovers from cross-border bank ownership are strong, and banking sectors are highly profitable.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256757
    Edition: Revised version, May 2021
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 290 (May 27, 2021)
    Subjects: banking union; bank regulation; bailout policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Does the market believe in loss-absorbing bank debt?
    Author: Indergand, Martin; Hrasko, Gabriela
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Swiss National Bank, Zurich

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: SNB working papers ; 2021, 13
    Subjects: financial stability; bank regulation; loss-absorbing capacity; creditor hierarchy; bail-in debt; bank resolution
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Banks' complexity-risk nexus and the role of regulation
    Author: Martynova, Natalya; Vogel, Ursula
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main

    We investigate the relationship between bank complexity and bank risk-taking using German banking data over the period 2005-2017. We find that more complex banking organizations tend to take on more risk, but that this complexity-risk nexus decreases... more

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    We investigate the relationship between bank complexity and bank risk-taking using German banking data over the period 2005-2017. We find that more complex banking organizations tend to take on more risk, but that this complexity-risk nexus decreases over time. We study how regulatory tightenings inherent in this period, and addressing systemically important banks (SIBs) in general and complexity more specifically, alter banks’ choices of complexity and risk. Banks reduce their complexity in response to regulatory tightenings, as these increase the related regulatory costs. Surprisingly, for SIBs in particular, the reduction of regulatory costs is associated with an increase in diversification benefits. As a result, they are able to lower their idiosyncratic risk more than other banks. The overall complexity-risk nexus is lower after regulatory tightenings. Thus, our results indicate that post-crisis regulation is effective in reducing banks’ complexity-risk nexus.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783957298225
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233941
    Series: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank ; no 2021, 14
    Subjects: bank complexity; bank risk-taking; bank regulation; too-big-to-fail
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Asset managers, market liquidity and bank regulation
    Author: Aldasoro, Iñaki; Huang, Wenqian; Tarashev, Nikola A.
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: BIS working papers ; no 933 (March 2021)
    Subjects: investment funds; herding; bank regulation; leverage ratio; social welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. An empirical foundation for calibrating the G-SIB surcharge
    Author: Jiron, Alexander; Passmore, Stuart Wayne; Werman, Aurite
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: BIS working papers ; no 935 (March 2021)
    Subjects: xxxxxx investment funds; herding; bank regulation; leverage ratio; social welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Regulatory and bailout decisions in a banking union
    Author: Haufler, Andreas
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors differ in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory decision of... more

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    We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors differ in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory decision of which banks are to be shut down before they can go bankrupt, and (ii) a loss allocation – or bailout – decision of who pays for banks that have failed despite regulatory oversight. Each of these choices can either be taken in a centralized or in a decentralized way. In our benchmark model the two countries always agree on a centralized regulation policy. In contrast, bailout policies are centralized only when international spillovers from cross-border bank ownership are strong, and banking sectors are highly profitable.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235334
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8964 (2021)
    Subjects: banking union; bank regulation; bailout policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Are bank bailouts welfare improving?
    Author: Shukayev, Malik; Ueberfeldt, Alexander
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics, [Edmonton, Alberta]

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    Series: Working paper / University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Department of Economics ; no. 2021, 10
    Subjects: Fire sales externality; short-term bank funding; endogenous financial crises; bank regulation; bailouts; government guarantees
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Know your customer: relationship lending and bank trading
    Author: Haselmann, Rainer; Leuz, Christian; Schreiber, Sebastian
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance, House of Finance, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    In this study, we analyze the trading behavior of banks with lending relationships. We combine detailed German data on banks' proprietary trading and market making with lending information from the credit register and then examine how banks trade... more

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    In this study, we analyze the trading behavior of banks with lending relationships. We combine detailed German data on banks' proprietary trading and market making with lending information from the credit register and then examine how banks trade stocks of their borrowers around important corporate events. We find that banks trade more frequently and also profitably ahead of events when they are the main lender (or relationship bank) for the borrower. Specifically, we show that relationship banks are more likely to build up positive (negative) trading positions in the two weeks before positive (negative) news events, and also that they unwind these positions shortly after the event. This trading pattern is more pronounced for unscheduled earnings events, M&A transactions, and after borrower obtain new bank loans. Our results suggest that lending relationships endow banks with important information, highlighting the potential for conflicts of interest in banking, which has been a prominent concern in the regulatory debate

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/244702
    Series: LawFin working paper ; no. 22
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten)