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  1. International bailouts
    why did banks' collective bet lead Europe to rescue Greece?
    Author: Mengus, Eric
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Banque de France, Paris

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Nicht speichern
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Document de travail / Banque de France ; 502
    Subjects: Implicit guarantees; bailouts; capital flows; capital controls
    Scope: Online-Ressource (57 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Zsfassung in franz. Sprache
  2. Bailouts and financial fragility
    Author: Keister, Todd
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ

    Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond by using public resources... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 66 (2014,1)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond by using public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a "bailout" distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: while it induces intermediaries to become more liquid, it may nevertheless lower welfare and leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can both improve the allocation of resources and promote financial stability.

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/123819
    Series: Working papers / Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey ; 2014-01
    Subjects: bank runs; bailouts; moral hazard; financial regulation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (44 S.), graph. Darst.