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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. River sharing and water trade
    conference paper
    Author: Weikard, Hans-Peter; Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael F.
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

     
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    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79931
    Series: Array ; V2
    Subjects: Fluss; Wassermangel; Wassermarkt; Sachenrecht; Umweltabkommen; Koalition; Kooperatives Spiel
    Scope: Online-Ressource (21 S.)
  2. Subglobal climate agreements and energy-intensive activities
    an evaluation of carbon leakage in the copper industry
    Author: Lanz, Bruno; Rutherford, Thomas F.; Tilton, John E.
    Published: [2013]
    Publisher:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    Subglobal climate policies induce changes in international competitiveness and favor a relocation of carbon-emitting activities to non-abating regions. In this paper, we evaluate the potential for CO2 abatement and the emissions `leakage' effect in... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 590 (174)
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    No inter-library loan

     

    Subglobal climate policies induce changes in international competitiveness and favor a relocation of carbon-emitting activities to non-abating regions. In this paper, we evaluate the potential for CO2 abatement and the emissions `leakage' effect in the copper industry, a prominent energy-intensive trade-exposed sector. We formulate a plant-level spatial equilibrium model for copper commodities in which parameters describing the behavioral response of agents are calibrated to econometric estimates of price elasticities. We find producers and consumers to be price inelastic even in the long-run, making the copper industry unresponsive to climate policies. Monte Carlo simulations with our model based on statistical uncertainty on elasticity estimates suggest that around 30% of emissions reductions in industrialized countries would be compensated by an increase of emissions in non-abating countries.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/171617
    Edition: This version: January 2013
    Series: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 13, 174 (February 2013)
    Subjects: Umweltabkommen; Treibhausgas-Emissionen; Umweltabgabe; Umweltstandard; Branchenentwicklung; Kupferindustrie; Monte-Carlo-Simulation; Welt; Carbon leakage; Pollution haven effect; Carbon leakage; Pollution haven effect; Climate policy; International environmental agreements; International trade; Copper industry
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The fatter the tail, the fatter the climate agreement
    simulating the influence of fat tails in climate change damages on the success of international climate negotiations
    Author: Dekker, Thijs; Dellink, Rob; Ketterer, Janina
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages,... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (4059)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the 'fat tail', on the formation of an international mitigation agreement. We systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version of the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Our aim is to identify how changes to the distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance. We find that fatter upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the performance of these stable coalitions. Fatter tails thus imply more successful, or 'fatter', international climate agreements.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/69602
    Series: Array ; 4059
    Subjects: Klimaschutz; Umweltabkommen; Verhandlungen; Koalition; Klimawandel; Soziale Kosten; Risiko; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource, graph. Darst.
  4. Waste of effort?
    international environmental agreements
    Author: Kellenberg, Derek K.; Levinson, Arik
    Published: 2013

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (19533)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 19533
    Subjects: Sonderabfall; Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung; Umweltabkommen; Wirkungsanalyse; Welt
    Scope: 45 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  5. River sharing and water trade
    conference paper
    Author: Weikard, Hans-Peter; Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael F.
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM 13
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79931
    Series: Array ; V2
    Subjects: Fluss; Wassermangel; Wassermarkt; Sachenrecht; Umweltabkommen; Koalition; Kooperatives Spiel; river sharing; water trade; market emergence; property rights; coaliion stability
    Scope: Online-Ressource (21 S.)