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  1. A Welfare Analysis of Tax Audits Across the Income Distribution
    Author: Boning, William C.; Hendren, Nathaniel; Sprung-Keyser, Ben; Stuart, Ellen
    Published: June 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield $5. We draw upon comprehensive internal accounting information and audit-level enforcement logs to quantify the average costs and revenues associated with each audit. We begin by estimating the average initial return to all audits of US taxpayers filing in 2010-2014. On average, $1 in audit spending raises $2.17 in initial revenue. Audits of high-income taxpayers are more costly, but the additional revenue raised more than offsets the costs. Audits of the 99-99.9th percentile have a 3.2:1 return; audits of the top 0.1% return 6.3:1. We then exploit the 40% audit reduction between tax years 2010 and 2014 to examine the returns to marginal audits. We find they exceed the returns to average audits. Revenues remain relatively unchanged but marginal costs fall below average costs due to economies of scale. Next, we use randomly selected audits to examine the impact of an initial audit on future revenue. This specific deterrence effect produces at least three times more revenue than the initial audit. Deterrence effects are relatively consistent across the income distribution. This results in the 12:1 return above the 90th percentile. We conclude by estimating the welfare consequences of audits using the MVPF framework and comparing audits to other revenue raising policies. We find that audits raise revenue at lower welfare cost

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w31376
    Subjects: Steuerfahndung; Steuerstrafrecht; Steuererhebungsverfahren; Einkommensverteilung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; USA; General
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Ghosting the tax authority
    fake firms and tax fraud in Ecuador
    Author: Carrillo, Paul E.; Donaldson, Dave; Pomeranz, Dina; Singhal, Monica
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  URPP Equality of Opportunity, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: URPP Equality of Opportunity discussion paper series ; no. 12 (February 2023)
    Subjects: Briefkastenfirma; Steuerstrafrecht; Ecuador
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Toward an Understanding of Tax Amnesties
    Theory and Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment
    Author: Gil, Patricia; Holz, Justin E.; List, John A.; Simon, Andrew; Zentner, Alejandro
    Published: May 2023
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    In modern economies, when debt and trust issues arise, a partial forgiveness policy is often the solution to induce payment and increase disclosure. For their part, governments around the globe continue to use tax amnesties as a strategy to allow... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    In modern economies, when debt and trust issues arise, a partial forgiveness policy is often the solution to induce payment and increase disclosure. For their part, governments around the globe continue to use tax amnesties as a strategy to allow debtors to make amends for past misdeeds in exchange for partial debt forgiveness. While ubiquitous, much remains unknown about the basic facts of how well amnesties work, for whom, and why. We present a simple theoretical construct that provides both economic clarity into tax amnesties as well as insights into the necessary behavioral parameters that one must estimate to understand the consequences of tax amnesties. We partner with the Dominican Republic Tax Authorities to design a natural field experiment that is linked to the theory to estimate key causal mechanisms. Empirical results from our field experiment, which covers 125,452 taxpayers who collectively owe $5.2 billion (5.5% of GDP) in known debt, highlight the import of deterrence laws, beliefs about future amnesties, and tax morale for debt payment and increased disclosure. Importantly, we find large short run effects: our most effective treatment (deterrence) increased payments of known debt by 25% and hidden debt by 48%. Further, we find no evidence of our intervention backfiring on subsequent tax payments

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w31210
    Subjects: Steuerstrafrecht; Straffreiheit; Feldforschung; Dominikanische Republik; Field Experiments; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers