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Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Can regulation on loan-loss-provisions for credit risk affect the mortgage market?
    evidence from administrative data in Chile
    Author: Calani, Mauricio
    Published: April 2019
    Publisher:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 546
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: September 2018
    Series: BIS working papers ; no 780
    Subjects: Loan Loss Provisions; LTV; Screening; Coarsened Exact Matching; Macro-Prudential Policy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Paper produced as part of the BIS Consultative Council for the Americas (CCA) research conference on "Microdata and economic research at central banks", hosted by the Central Bank of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, 4-5 June 2018
  2. Targeting Disability Insurance applications with screening
    Author: Godard, Mathilde; Koning, Pierre; Lindeboom, Maarten
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 432
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    We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants at the point of the award decision. We use administrative data on DI claims and awards and merge these with other administrative data on hospitalization, mortality and labor market outcomes. Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) regressions show substantial declines in DI application rates and changes in the composition of the pool of applicants. We find that the health of those who are not discouraged from applying is worse than those who are. This suggests that the pool of applicants becomes more deserving. At the same time, compared with those who did not apply under the old system of more lax screening, those who are discouraged from applying are in worse health, have substantially lower earnings and are more often unemployed. This indicates that there are spillovers of the DI reform to other social insurance programs. As we do not find additional screening effects on health at the point of the award decision, we conclude that changes in the health condition of the pool of awarded applicants are fully driven by self-screening of (potential) applicants.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/205326
    Series: Array ; TI 2019, 036
    Subjects: Disability Insurance; Screening; Composition effects; Targeting efficiency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Screening by mode of trade
    Author: Beccuti, Juan; Möller, Marc
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Bern, Switzerland

    This paper proposes a mechanism design approach, capable of endogenizing a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment. Allowing for mechanisms that determine the good’s... more

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    This paper proposes a mechanism design approach, capable of endogenizing a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment. Allowing for mechanisms that determine the good’s allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period, we show that the profit-maximizing mechanism features screening by mode of trade. By selling to high types while renting to low types, the monopolist overcomes the obstacles encountered by intertemporal price discrimination and induces immediate separation of types for arbitrary low priors.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228886
    Series: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 19, 08 (November 2019)
    Subjects: Durable goods; Dynamic mechanism design; Coase problem; Ratchet effect; Screening
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Klinische Validierung des Dental Aesthetic Screening Index
    ein dentalästhetischer Index zur quantitativen Erfassung restaurativer Therapieergebnisse
    Author: Specht, Regina
    Published: 2019

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Print
    Subjects: Validierung; Screening; Therapie; Ästhetik; Zahnmedizin
    Scope: III, 88 Blätter, Illustrationen, Diagramme, 30 cm
    Notes:

    Dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, 2019
  5. The returns to ability and experience in high school labor markets
    revisiting evidence on employer learning and statistical discrimination
    Author: Li, Xizi; Ross, Stephen L.
    Published: January 2019
    Publisher:  University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, Storrs, CT

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Department of Economics working paper series / University of Connecticut ; 2019, 01
    Subjects: Wages; Human Capital; Ability; Screening; Signaling; Learning; Statistical Discrimination; AFQT; Education; Compensating Differential; Training; Occupation; NLSY
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Screening and selection
    the case of mammograms
    Author: Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy; Oostrom, Tamar; Ostriker, Abigail; Williams, Heidi
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  SIEPR, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, CA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) ; 19, 021
    Subjects: Krebskrankheit; Gesundheitsvorsorge; USA; Screening; cancer
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen