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Displaying results 1 to 2 of 2.

  1. Partnership firms, reputation, and human capital
    Published: 24 Jan. 2003
    Publisher:  Oxford Financial Research Centre, Oxford

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1486 (2003.02)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: [Elektronische Ressource]
    Series: Oxford Financial Research Centre economics series ; 2003,02
    Subjects: Partnerschaftsgesellschaft; Reputation; Humankapital
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 25 p. = 314 KB, text, ill
  2. Moral hazard in teams, anti-insurance, and a new theory of the firm
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  CSLE, Saarbrücken

    The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1466 (2003.02)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in which each team member chooses first-best effort. We call this mechanism "Anti-Sharingʺ since it solves the sharing problem that causes the inefficiency in teams. The Anti-Sharing mechanism requires one player to specialize on the role of an "Anti-Sharerʺ. With an external Anti-Sharer who works on a non-profit base, the mechanism can implement first-best effort. If, however, the Anti-Sharer comes from within the team and desires a positive payoff, then the mechanism may implement not more than second-best effort. The latter version of the model could be interpreted as a new theory of firms and partnerships in the sense of the theory of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).

     
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: [Elektronische Ressource]
    Series: CSLE Diskussionsbeitrag ; 2003-02
    Subjects: Arbeitsgruppe; Moral Hazard; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Gewinnverwendung; Haftung; Versicherungsökonomik; Theorie der Unternehmung; Partnerschaftsgesellschaft; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 17 p., text, ill