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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Shooting lost places
    Fotografie an verlassenen und mystischen Orten
    Author: Dombrow, Charlie
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Franzis, Haar bei München

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  2. Shooting Lost Places
    Fotografie an verlassenen und mystischen Orten
    Author: Dombrow, Charlie
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Franzis Verlag, Haar

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  3. Shooting Lost Places
    Fotografie an verlassenen und mystischen Orten
    Author: Dombrow, Charlie
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Franzis Verlag, Haar

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783645222587
    Other identifier:
    9783645222587
    Series: Fotografie al dente
    Other subjects: (Produktform)Electronic book text; (BISAC Subject Heading)PHO023010; (BISAC Subject Heading)PHO023040; (VLB-WN)9415; Fotografie; Fotografieren; Location; Mystik; Kamera; Computer; Bildbearbeitung; Rohdaten; Urban; Urbex; Ästhetik; Urbexer; Postprocessing; HDR; Pixel; Architektur; Landschaft; Natur; Mittelalter; Ruinen; Bildmontage; Shooting; Reise; (VLB-WN)9954
    Scope: Online-Ressourcen, 256 Seiten
    Notes:

    Lizenzpflichtig
  4. Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game
    the case of n ≥ 4 firms
    Author: Ewerhart, Christian
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Zurich

    The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 191 (168)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞, the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/111224
    Series: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; 168
    Subjects: Location; Hotelling game; mixed-strategy equilibrium; boundary value problem
    Scope: Online-Ressource (21 S.), graph. Darst.
  5. Product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model
    Author: Ebina, Takeshi; Matsushima, Noriaki; Shimizu, Daisuke
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Inst. of Social and Economic Research, Osaka

    We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that... more

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198 (915)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the centre to delay the follower's entry, leading to a non-maximum differentiation outcome. We also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader's location and firms' values and, in particular, numerically show that the profit of the leader changes non-monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/127064
    Series: Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research ; 915
    Subjects: Location; Hotelling model; Continuous time; Entry timing
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.)